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Abstract 
This paper sets out an overarching theoretical framework for explaining and 
exploring the processes of social exclusion, incorporating themes from the 
literature. It proposes that inclusion hinges on participation in social 
relationships enacted through ‘transactional processes’, where currencies are 
assessed and goods distributed or withheld accordingly. ‘Currencies’ are not just 
financial, but also human – evidence of human or social capital – what people 
have, do or are. The currencies required depend on the objective of the 
transaction. However, even where people have currency, transaction may be 
prevented by inaccessible infrastructure (buildings, transport, communications, 
etc), or through failure to recognize currency. Both poverty (lack of capital or 
currencies) and discrimination (failure to enable, recognize, or act consistently 
upon, the presentation of currencies) need to be tackled. 
 
The components that make up social context are explored: the norms and socio-
cultural objectives (economic, social, political, etc) and the transactions, 
currencies and goods which are consequently prioritized. Terms of inclusion 
may accommodate more, or less, objectives, currencies and goods, 
notwithstanding that some objectives will be mutually incompatible and that 
production of certain goods (e.g. land) cannot be increased.  
 
Objectives and norms impact on how identity is construed, or misconstrued. A 
typology of discrimination is described, along with its potential exclusory 
outcomes. Yet, changes in attitudes and priorities might reveal scope for 
redrafting the terms of inclusion to promote and preserve greater diversity 
within the mainstream.    
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Non-Technical Summary 
Despite an increasing political focus on promoting social inclusion and the 
development of a related discourse, social exclusion remains an ill-defined, 
contested concept. This paper describes an overarching theoretical framework 
for explaining and exploring the processes of social exclusion, drawing on 
themes from the literature. It proposes that inclusion hinges on participation in 
social relationships enacted through a variety of ‘transactional processes’, where 
currencies are assessed and goods distributed or withheld accordingly.  
 
‘Currencies’ are human as well as financial, providing evidence of human or 
social capital – what people do and are as well as have. Although transactions 
can be for different purposes and of different types – free market or social 
rights-based, formal or informal – a broad generic process can be described. 
Transactions are ‘framed’ (currency criteria are identified, who will administer 
it, the nature of the good to be allocated, etc), currencies are presented by 
transactors and assessed by administrators who allocate goods. Currencies 
required depend on the objective of the transaction. However, even where 
people have currency, transaction may be prevented by inaccessible 
infrastructure (buildings, transport, communications, etc) or through failure of 
framers or administrators to recognize currency. The dynamics of transaction 
depend on scarcity – e.g. there may be insufficient goods to meet transactors’ 
demands, or too few transactors to whom to distribute goods. Sometimes 
scarcity of goods can be addressed by increasing production, sometimes not 
(e.g. land). Scarcity may be deliberately created to generate profit or steer 
behaviour. 
 
The social context – its cultural norms and socio-cultural objectives (economic, 
social, political, civil, and religious or spiritual) – is critical in determining what 
transaction, currencies and goods are prioritized, and thus the terms of 
inclusion. Each socio-cultural objective may have a range of transactions within 
its sphere, each with its own objective and currency requirements, e.g., if the 
broad economic objective is wealth creation, a variety of transactions may fall 
within the economic sphere, to acquire skills, get employment, trade goods, etc. 
If the objective is promotion of a particular religious code, another series of 
transactions might be necessary. Sometimes the fulfilment of one objective 
depends on others not being fulfilled; sometimes objectives and transactions are 
interdependent.  
 
Types of currencies may be particularly associated with a particular sphere or 
transaction, and inappropriate to fulfil other objectives. The more different 
socio-cultural objectives are endorsed within a given social context, the greater 
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the likelihood of inclusion. Exclusion is exacerbated when one type of currency 
becomes the only way to access all or most goods, and that currency is 
inequitably distributed.  
 
In a multi-cultural society, where different understandings about norms and 
objectives co-exist and people have diverse characteristics, the social context is 
unlikely to be static. The persistent exclusion of people with a shared 
characteristic can engender movements or counter-cultures, in the struggle to 
reprioritize or frame transactions or achieve recognition of existing currency. 
Dynamics may also be generated by external events, or by institutions at 
different societal levels contesting powers to frame. 
 
Currencies and goods also serve as indicators of identity. Objectives and norms 
impact on how identity is construed, or misconstrued through the ‘dialogical 
relation’ necessitated by transactional processes. Evidence of one characteristic 
or currency may be taken to indicate the presence or absence of others. 
Administrators may need to make rapid and accurate assessments to ensure an 
appropriate distribution of goods. Short-cut indicators may be used as evidence 
of capacity, agency and degree of threat of benefit that might ensue. Yet, 
indicators may be unreliable, based on unquestioned, narrow norms.  
 
Discrimination, or unjustifiably unfavourable treatment, may be attitudinal, 
behavioural, deliberate or not, direct or indirect, or combinations of these. 
Resulting barriers include environmental, communication, organisational or 
financial barriers, again often inter-related. While social rights-based 
transactions may be seen as non-discriminatory they often rely on assessing 
human currencies. These are often more complex and unreliable than 
assessments of money in exchange for goods. As such, the scope for 
discrimination, i.e. reliance on inaccurate short-cut indicators, might be greater 
with regard to the former.  
 
To promote inclusion, it might be possible to ‘adjust’ people (behaviour, skills, 
use of equipment, etc) to ‘fit ‘the social context. Alternatively, the social context 
might be adjusted by redrafting the terms of inclusion to widen the mainstream, 
or by introducing special programmes for people with otherwise 
unaccommodated characteristics. However, the latter approach can also serve to 
define or underscore difference and exclusion.  
 
To promote inclusion into all spheres, the most conducive structure is likely to 
be one which endorses and values different objectives and acknowledges that a 
range of currencies and transactions are required in order to meet each. Norms 
should acknowledge that people have various currencies and avoid making 
stereotypical judgements on the presence or absence of others, based on 
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evidence of one. Competition for one good becomes dissipated as different 
goods are equally and commonly valued. Rather than alternatives creating 
competition, providing all have equal value, the opposite must be true. 
Moreover, if equal value is placed on different currencies and goods, and in 
participation in different transactional processes, inequality with regard to any 
one is less likely to indicate exclusion overall.  
 
Both poverty (lack of capital or currencies) and discrimination (failure to 
enable, recognize, or act consistently upon, the presentation of currencies) need 
to be tackled to promote inclusion. While some objectives and norms will be 
unavoidably incompatible, some goods unavoidably scarce and some currencies 
inappropriate for certain transactions, changes to attitudes and priorities might 
reveal scope for redrafting the terms of inclusion to promote and preserve 
greater diversity within the mainstream.    
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An Overview of the Case to be Made 
To include or exclude, that is the question besetting Western societies at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. Fears about opening the flood-gates, or of 
inadvertently harbouring those bent on destruction, are counter-balanced by 
fears that exclusion will provoke, and perhaps even justify, destructive forces. 
Communities within the same city lead parallel lives, divided along lines of 
ethnicity, religion and/or income. Yet, sometimes the question of whether or not 
to exclude is never consciously posed. Exclusion arises just the same. In Britain, 
certain groups are more likely to experience exclusion, not necessarily as a 
consequence of deliberate, explicit policy – indeed the declared policy intention 
may be quite the reverse.  
 
Despite an increasing political focus on promoting social inclusion and the 
development of a related discourse, social exclusion remains an ill-defined, 
contested concept (Burchardt et al 1999). Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
only thing observers do agree on is the impossibility of defining social 
exclusion using a single criterion (Weinberg and Ruano-Borbalan 1993). It is 
not the purpose of this paper to seek to identify such a criterion, but rather to 
describe a single, if not altogether simple, approach to conceptualising the 
underlying structures and processes which can underpin the many 
manifestations of exclusion.  
 
Debate often centres on groups of people prone to exclusion, such as people 
who are unemployed, disabled, elderly, or from minority ethnic communities 
(e.g. Silver 1994). Exclusion may be concentrated in certain geographical areas, 
often with a disproportionate demographic representation of people with such 
characteristics. It is often described as a process of interconnected outcomes, 
e.g. ill-health, poor housing, low educational attainment, unemployment, 
financial hardship, etc. These tend to ‘cluster’ in a downward spiral, one 
provoking the other, and combining together to create exclusion (e.g. Berghman 
1995, Walker 1995).  
 
Poverty tends to be a common thread running throughout. Indeed, it has long 
been argued that possession of a certain level of material resources is 
prerequisite for participation in the activities customary to a given society 
(Townsend 1979). If inclusion is defined in terms of participation, and it is hard 
to see how it could be defined otherwise, this suggests that it can be achieved 
through the eradication of relative poverty and a reduction of inequalities in the 
distribution of material resources (Levitas 1998). However, there are other 
important themes in the literature, each of them offering insights into the nature 
of exclusion. There is no obvious reason why these themes should be 
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incompatible, potentially describing different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
Yet, no over-arching model incorporating all of them currently exists. 
 
Relationships: Exclusion arises from the “rupture of the relationship between 
the individual and society” (Gore et al 1995, p2, also Room 1995). People may 
be excluded from or by societal relationships, whether founded upon adherence 
around norms (solidarity paradigm), or on a contractual framework 
(specialisation paradigm) or consequent on the distribution of a ‘fixed pot’ of 
resources (monopoly paradigm) (Silver 1994). This, however, seems to say little 
about how societal relationships are enacted, e.g. through the exchange of 
resources, and whether the enactment of certain forms of societal relationship is 
what is meant by ‘customary activities’.  
 
The ‘underclass’: The excluded are viewed as members of an ‘underclass’, with 
different behavioural norms, aspirations, expectations and morals, which 
threaten to undermine those of mainstream society (e.g. Levitas 1998, Morris 
1994). In effect, this amounts to a solidarity paradigm approach, arguing that the 
individual/societal relationship is ruptured by the failure, or perhaps inability, of 
individuals to adhere to socially approved norms. 
 
Unemployment: Exclusion is seen as the consequence of unemployment 
(Paugam 1993, Levitas 1998). Inclusion, therefore, becomes synonymous with 
employment – a stance promoted by much of New Labour’s social security 
policy. Certainly, in our society employment would count as a key ‘customary 
activity’ and it is the main way through which material resources are acquired. 
 
Social insurance coverage: Exclusion arises when people fall through the social 
insurance net, and are thus ‘administratively excluded’ (Lenoir 1974, Duffy 
1997). Yet, over the last twenty years or so, in the UK there have been 
significant reductions in the value and coverage of social insurance benefits, 
alongside an increase in means testing. Nonetheless, the welfare state remains 
an important embodiment of the individual/societal relationship. This was cast 
as contractual (although others might see it as an expression of solidarity) in the 
Government’s Green Paper on Welfare Reform (1998), which sought to promote 
‘a new contract for welfare’. 
 
Dimensions: Exclusion has different dimensions, e.g. economic, social, political 
and cultural (Rodgers 1995), reflecting the dimensions of society. Some have 
described dimensions in terms of activities, such as consumption, savings, 
production, political and social activities, then proceeded to explore inter-
connections between them (Burchardt et al 1999, see also Gordon et al 2000). 
This could be construed to indicate that different resources, customary activities 
and types of relationship are key to different societal dimensions.  
  
6 
The latter in particular suggests that exclusion must to some extent be 
determined by how society is structured: “a central aspect of the analysis of 
exclusion is the idea that it is embedded in the way societies function” (Rodgers 
1995, p49). Thus, instead of seeing exclusion as attributable to certain personal 
characteristics of individuals or groups, it may instead be more fruitful to 
consider whether it is possible to adjust the structuring and functioning of 
society so as to facilitate the inclusion of people with those characteristics. This 
is not to argue that individuals can never bear any responsibility for their own 
inclusion or exclusion. It would be foolish to deny the possibility that some may 
become excluded as a consequence of their own choices and actions, or that 
inclusion can sometimes be achieved through ‘adjustments’ to individuals, such 
as the acquisition of new skills. Critical to determining inclusion or exclusion is 
the interface between individual and society, and whether the relationship 
between the two can be positively influenced by adjustments to either. To 
address exclusion, it thus becomes necessary to explore societal relationships in 
more detail: what form they take, how they are enacted and the basis on which 
access and participation in them are made possible or rendered impossible. It 
may also be the case that some societal relationships are more important than 
others for inclusion, and possible that some forms may in fact denote exclusion 
rather than inclusion.  
 
The conceptual model presented here aims to provide a framework for analysis 
of how exclusion can occur. It considers the meaning and processes of 
inclusion, how these are fashioned according to the structuring and operation of 
society, and the ways, consequently, in which individuals can become excluded. 
This implies that there will be different ways in which they can be included. At 
the extremes, inclusion might be achieved through maximising options for 
diversity, or through imposing conformity to a narrowly drawn norm. If the 
former, it is then a question of how diversity is to be included. This may be 
achieved through the creation of special ‘add-on’ arrangements, as discussed in 
the literature on multiculturalism (for example, Barry 2001, Taylor 1992). 
Alternatively, it may be possible to widen the norm through developing terms of 
inclusion which can accommodate diversity within the mainstream. The more 
narrowly we pinpoint the ‘customary activities’ and criteria for access, the 
greater the cultural and demographic homogeneity required to achieve 
inclusion. We should not, therefore, conflate inclusion with conformity – an 
inclusive society may instead be one that accommodates diversity. The basis for 
inclusion will depend on how society is structured and operates, the criteria for 
accessing and enacting key societal relationships, how these are interpreted and 
whether or not participation is enforced. It is these ‘terms of inclusion’, not the 
fact of inclusion, that matter.  
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If, as the literature suggests, inclusion is multi-dimensional, process-based and 
fluid over time, to seek to designate the boundary (or even boundaries) between 
inclusion and exclusion in terms of a two-dimensional ‘line’ (as per ‘the poverty 
line’) is unlikely to be a helpful way to proceed. Instead, through identification 
of what constitutes the component parts of society and its operations, and scope 
for variation, the implications of different ‘terms of inclusion’ can be discerned. 
Thus, it becomes possible to suggest what terms are required, if the maximum 
diversity is to be included and mainstreamed. It is proposed that the ‘terms of 
inclusion’ of any society are derived from the structuring of society, the 
competing or interdependent objectives, values and dimensions of which it is 
comprised, and the societal relationships and criteria for access prioritised by 
whichever dominates.  
 
The paper focuses on the ways in which societal relationships are enacted, and 
why some are more important than others. Clearly, there are a variety of ways in 
which individuals may relate to wider society, “we come together to share, 
divide and exchange” (Waltzer 1983, p3), within economic, social, political, 
civil or religious societal dimensions or spheres. The questions then arise of 
what is the basis for these relationships, what is their purpose and how they are 
enacted. Some may be enacted through monetary exchange, others may be 
rights-based (Okun 1975) or rooted in the recognition of designated 
(consciously or otherwise) characteristics, behaviours or beliefs. 
 
Depending on the reason for the transaction, the criteria for access will vary: 
“there has never been a single criterion, or single set of interconnected criteria, 
for all distributions. Desert, qualification, birth and blood, friendship, need, free 
exchange, political loyalty, democratic decision: each has had its place, along 
with many others…” (Walzer 1983, p4). The fact that there are criteria remains 
constant, whether or not they are explicitly expressed and assessed. However, 
those cited by Walzer are not all criteria themselves. Some, such as desert or 
need, can be seen as qualities relating to the objectives for transaction which 
criteria are designed to demonstrate. Others, like free exchange or friendship, 
describe a type of societal relationship, access to which may hinge on the 
endorsement of certain criteria, whether or not explicit, whether or not publicly 
or privately determined. Walzer also suggests “The idea of distributive justice 
has as much to do with being and doing as with having…” (1983, p3). It follows 
that criteria for access to societal relationships and consequent distributions may 
not just be concerned with what a person has, but with what they do and what 
they are – or appear to be. Inclusion may not depend on material resources, but 
more broadly on how relevant aspects of identity are selected, identified and 
understood. 
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Economists have drawn distinctions between differing forms of capital – 
human, e.g. educational (Becker 1964), financial, e.g. savings, or physical e.g. 
land. Bourdieu (1984) and others from a sociological perspective included both 
consumption and production-related skills, accumulated artistic and recreational 
experiences as well as those gained in the workplace (cited in Gershuny 1998). 
While financial or physical capital can be converted into money for the 
purposes of transaction, it is less clear how human capital is to be converted into 
trustworthy currency. How are capacities, experience and potential skills to be 
defined, demonstrated and assessed? How important is the transaction of 
‘human currency’ for inclusion? If currencies other than financial are 
significant, this signals that inclusion may not be achieved by the eradication of 
poverty, although insufficient material resources may indeed be a major cause of 
exclusion, and access to them may be enhanced or inhibited by behaviour and 
personal characteristics.  
 
Despite the evident differences in their superficial manifestations, it will be 
argued that it is possible and useful to discern underlying commonalities in 
societal relationships. Through delving beneath the surface, we may acquire a 
better understanding of how exclusion originates and what common forces lie 
beneath its many manifestations. As this is social rather than medical science, 
the skeletal framework of societal relationships can only be theoretically 
imputed – we do not have the options of X-rays or dissection. While it may, 
nonetheless, be possible to devise ways of examining it empirically, this lies 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Notwithstanding their many differences, it is proposed that it is possible to 
describe a generic transactional process through which societal relationships are 
enacted. This can be characterised as the presentation of financial or human 
currencies (material resources, evidence of behaviour or personal characteristics 
respectively), the assessment of the currency presented, followed by the 
allocation, distribution or withholding of ‘goods’. To vote in an election, get a 
job, buy a Mars bar, attend a football match or receive religious absolution, each 
necessitates, and is part of, some form of transactional process. In each case, 
material resources, behaviour and/or personal characteristics are assessed and 
something is received in return. All depend on some combination of financial, 
physical and human capital, converted into recognisable currencies in the forms 
of amounts and types of material resources, specified behaviours and/or 
personal characteristics. Each serves as an indicator (accurate, conscious or 
otherwise) of the identity of the prospective transactor. Put another way, access 
to participation in societal relationships depends on identity, or rather those 
aspects of it which are deemed relevant to the objective of transaction, and how 
these are conveyed and assessed.  
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To attempt to describe a generic transactional process through which all societal 
relationships are enacted poses considerable difficulties, not least of all 
linguistic. This is because language has developed to describe particular types 
of process – thus ‘currency’ typically applies to economic transactions, whereas 
adjudication or allocation are more commonly associated with rights-based 
transactions concerned with the distribution of public resources. Depending on 
the transaction, different stages of the process may be emphasised or down-
played. Assessment in free-market transactions will often be nothing more than 
adding up the cash, while ‘allocation’ simply means handing over the good 
purchased. In contrast, rights-based transactions for public resources will often 
rely on complex criteria and assessments. A social-rights-type transaction, such 
as for means tested jobseekers allowance, involves the assessment of income 
(material resources), job-search activities (behaviour), age, nationality and 
family circumstances (personal characteristics). Some welfare processes have 
been characterised as ‘unilateral transfers’ of resources (Titmuss, 1970). 
However, even though no exchange literally occurs, and what is presented for 
assessment (evidence of lack of money, personal characteristics, behaviours) is 
not then reusable by those responsible for assessment and allocation, this 
remains consistent with the generic model proposed here.  
 
To continue the currency/goods analogy, this implies that both currency and 
goods can take a variety of forms. The terminology remains useful, in that it 
distinguishes different stages of the transactional process. In this paper, 
‘currency’ will be used to denote that which is presented, ‘goods’ to denote that 
which is allocated or distributed and ‘resources’ to denote both collectively. The 
definitions of ‘currency’ and ‘goods’ clearly extend beyond what is usually 
understood by such terms. While it could be argued that ‘resources’ covers both, 
its meaning still needs to be stretched beyond its customary usage, if it is to 
encompass the ‘human currency’ of behaviour and personal characteristics.  
 
Not all societal relationships will be of equal importance for inclusion within a 
given society. Depending on their structuring around objectives, norms and 
values, particular types of societal relationships, i.e. transactional processes, 
currencies and goods are prioritised, while others are devalued and stigmatised. 
Moreover, the experience of exclusion may have implications for the creation of 
new structures and cultures. Clearly, this is not straightforward. We live in a 
multi-cultural society and the societal relationships and activities regarded as 
key to ‘inclusion’ by those operating according to one set of socio-cultural 
norms, may not be so regarded by others. The term ‘socio-cultural’ is clumsy, 
but is intended to convey a convergence between cultural and structural 
features, given the close symbiotic relationship between the two. It is debatable 
which moulds which – whether societal structures engender cultural norms or 
vice versa. Either way, the social context is broadly comprised of expressed or 
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assumed understandings of what the objectives for society should be, what 
values and norms should apply and how society should be structured.  
 
As nationally-determined societal boundaries become increasingly eroded 
through globalisation and associated mobility, one particular set of objectives, 
norms and/or belief-sets can no longer be straightforwardly equated with a 
particular nation state – if, indeed, that was ever possible. This is not to argue 
that ‘society’ no longer exists, but to acknowledge that a new geography of 
cross-national cultural boundaries is emerging. Different cultural boundaries 
will be more or less permeable to others. Society is conceptualised as comprised 
of competing, converging and compatible socio-cultural understandings, which 
co-exist within nationally-confined terrain. It must therefore be possible to be 
excluded from (or by) the prevailing objectives, norms and understandings 
within one society while being included in those elsewhere.  
 
Depending on the objectives a given society prioritises, so too can it be 
expected to prioritise the forms of transaction most likely to further those 
objectives. For Marx, labour was bargained for capital. Behaviour exhibiting 
political or religious conformity may be the means through which to acquire 
resources. To be included in a given society therefore means being able to, and 
choosing to, participate in the transactional processes prioritised by the 
prevailing socio-cultural understanding, or those that are compatible with it.  
 
It is not just particular transactional processes that are prioritised, but the types 
of characteristics or currencies which grant access to them. Certain possessions, 
behaviours or personal characteristics will be valued, while others may serve to 
invalidate the potential transactor. Access to participation in societal 
relationships depends on certain aspects of identity, as conveyed by what a 
person has, does and is. Depending on the nature of that relationship, different 
aspects of identity (material possessions, behaviour or personal characteristics) 
will be key. In other words, it is necessary to have the correct currency for the 
transaction. However, this alone is insufficient. Currency must not just be valid, 
it must be recognised as such by those framing the transactional process, i.e. 
those who decide what is to be taken into account, and by the administrators 
charged with assessing currency presented against those criteria. As Taylor 
commented, “Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form 
of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted mode of being.” (1992, 
p25). It might also result in exclusion. 
 
Difficulties arise because resources operate at different levels. They may exist in 
tangible form, as concrete entities, evidence garnered through experience or 
biological fact. But they also operate at an intangible, symbolic level. Evidence 
of one form of currency may be taken as indicative of the presence, or absence, 
  
11 
of others. These associations, and the meanings imputed to particular currencies 
or indicators, are also likely to be a product of (explicit or implicit) socio-
cultural norms. There can be a tendency to assign individuals to culturally-
derived stereotypical boxes. Having discerned one characteristic, conclusions 
are simultaneously inferred about others, specifically the level and nature of 
resources possessed and capacity to acquire them. To use disabilist terminology, 
transactional framers and currency assessors may not necessarily be ‘difference-
blind’ (Taylor 1992) but ‘sameness-blind’. Blinded by one over-riding, but 
irrelevant, indicator of difference, they are unable to discern that the required 
currencies are in fact possessed.  
 
It is not just a matter of how society responds to difference, but also whether it 
creates it in the first place. Difference, associated stigma and invalidity can be 
consequences of the nature and operation of society and how it frames its key 
transactional processes. They can result from narrowly drawn ‘terms of 
inclusion’ – rather than being attributable to the innate features of individuals, or 
immutable features of their environment. While the emphasis is frequently on 
how to ‘adjust’ individuals, it may equally be possible to adjust the terms of 
inclusion, in order to ensure that difference does not necessarily result in 
exclusion. This argument is commonly found in the field of disability in the 
guise of ‘social’ model. For example, “Disability is something imposed on top 
of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from 
full participation in society.” (Oliver 1996, p22). By adjusting the social context, 
people with impairments cease to be disabled. Without denying the differing 
societal barriers experienced by people with differing personal characteristics, 
the social model seems to have potential for wider application beyond the field 
of disability.  
 
However, broadly in keeping with an ‘interactionist model’ (e.g. Llewellyn and 
Kogan 2000, Barnes et al 1999), identities and the values associated with them 
do not exist in isolation: “My identity crucially depends on my dialogical 
relations with others.” (Taylor 1992, p34). Furthermore, “The projection of an 
inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the 
extent that the image is internalised.” (Taylor, 1992, p36). But it may not just be 
an image. For example, the experience of disability and exclusion may well be a 
daily reality, confirming the accuracy of the demeaning image. The terms of 
reference for construing and operationalising identities may, however, be flawed 
and thus identities are misconstrued. The misconstrual of identity, the failure to 
recognise currencies (deliberate or otherwise), and consequent exclusion from 
societal relationships, amounts to one major form of discrimination. Relying on 
criteria which are not pertinent to the purpose of transaction is another. 
Alternatively, discrimination may occur at the point of allocation, i.e. the 
required currency is possessed and accurately assessed but the good is 
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nonetheless withheld. As Thompson (1998) has argued, discrimination can exist 
at personal, cultural and structural levels – once again making the connection 
between exclusion and the ways in which society is structured. This suggests 
that discrimination could be broadly defined as failure to enable, recognise, or 
act consistently upon, the presentation of required currencies. This might 
contrast to a definition of poverty as a lack of required capital or currencies. A 
wider understanding of these to include human, social as well as financial 
resources would imply a wider definition of poverty. 
 
Having outlined the case, this paper proceeds to explore in more detail three 
cross-sections of the model. The first focuses on societal relationships, 
considering in generic terms the transactional process and its operation. It 
considers the stages of transaction, the roles performed, their currencies and 
goods. The importance of accessible infrastructure through which to convert and 
transact is highlighted, as well as the way in which dynamics of scarcity can be 
managed in order to achieve a variety of objectives. The second cross-section 
considers the implications of socio-cultural context for the prioritising, 
structuring and operationalising of transactional processes. A breakdown of the 
components of socio-cultural context is proposed, in terms of their norms, 
expectation and aspirations, objectives, transactional spheres of operations and 
degrees of enforcement. Their impact on influencing, or determining, the 
priorities and operations of transactional processes, and consequent implications 
for inclusion or exclusion, is discussed. The dynamics within and between 
different socio-cultural understandings is then reviewed and the section finishes 
with a brief discussion of inclusion as a relative rather than absolute 
phenomenon. The third considers the relationship of norms and objectives to 
transactional processes and how the ways in which these operate all have 
implications for the construal, and misconstrual, of identity. It considers how 
discrimination as ‘unjustifiably unfavourable treatment’ can intervene in 
different ways at different stages of transactional processes. It assesses the 
operation of social rights-based and free-market transactions, as the two major 
forms of transaction, and the scope each provides for discrimination, or 
misrecognition. Following the outline provided in this introduction, each section 
(or cross-section) should be understandable without reference to the others. 
However, to get a full understanding of its dimensions, the model is best viewed 
from different angles.  
 
In the course of this exercise, various propositions are touched upon: 
¾ Does lack of material resources necessarily lead to exclusion? 
Conversely, does possessing material resources necessarily guarantee 
inclusion? 
¾ Are degrees of inequalities necessarily indicative of degrees of exclusion 
or inclusion? 
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¾ Is equality of power and prestige theoretically impossible? 
¾ Are rights inherently anti-discriminatory? 
¾ Is competition a product of diversity and diversification, or of 
standardisation? 
 
Finally, conclusions are drawn about the terms of inclusion most likely to 
promote inclusion through maximising options for diversity while minimising 
the stigma of difference. In particular, it will be argued that much about societal 
objectives, norms and their interpretation via societal relationships is 
subconsciously assumed rather than rationally construed, explicitly expressed 
and debated. This attempt to render their underlying processes and their 
implications explicit can undoubtedly be improved upon. However, the central 
message remains that both financial and human currencies exist and are required 
for inclusion. Both poverty and discrimination may need to be tackled. Greater 
awareness is required of how the structuring and operation of society moulds, 
conveys and interprets identity as currencies, and how lack of awareness results 
in exclusion. 
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Section One: Transactional Processes 
1.  Introduction 
This section considers the stages of transactional processes through which it is 
conceptualised that societal relationships are enacted, the different roles within 
them and their underpinning infrastructure and dynamics. As will be explored, 
irrespective of eligibility or currency requirements, exclusion can also be 
generated by inaccessible infrastructure. Exclusion, or perhaps more accurately 
exclusivity, can also be what fuels the dynamics of transaction.  
 
2. An Overview of the Transactional Process 
At their most basic or generic, it is proposed that societal relationships are 
enacted through transactional processes, broadly comprised of a series of stages, 
actions and roles. Of course, the nature of societal relationships and their 
purposes varies hugely, from claiming benefits, casting a vote, caring for family 
members or purchasing a Mars Bar. The precise form that stages, actions and 
roles take can similarly be expected to vary. In some cases certain stages may 
seemingly be by-passed or incidental, while in others they require a range of 
complex actions and judgements. Sometimes roles may be conflated, sometimes 
clearly delineated. The process may be informal, conducted at a subconscious 
level, or explicitly and rationally mapped out, or a mixture of both. The generic 
model presented here is not intended to prescribe what should happen, or to 
describe what necessarily must always happen empirically. It is intended as an 
analytical tool for explaining the ways in which exclusion can occur.   
 
Table 1: The Generic Transactional Process 
STAGE 1: Framers set the purpose and parameters for the process, select 
criteria for access, decide who is to administer and how, etc 
 
STAGE 2: Transactors present currencies to administrators 
 
STAGE 3: Administrators assess currencies against criteria set by framers 
 
STAGE 4: Administrators allocate, distribute or withhold goods 
 
STAGE 5: Transactor consumes goods received OR the goods received are 
reused as currency in a new transaction. 
 
Currency received by the administrator may be reused in a new transaction – 
depending on the form of currency  
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3. Transactional Roles 
Depending on the nature of the relationship, roles will be more or less formal 
and evident. The illustrations given below broadly refer to formal relationships 
with societal institutions of one sort or another. When it comes to some informal 
social relationships like friendship, or membership of social peer groups, roles 
and distinctions between them can become very much harder to draw, as does 
the nature of associated transactional processes. It may be easier to detect them 
in other informal social relationships, like caring for a family member, or 
cohabitation with a sexual partner and children, perhaps because these may 
begin to fall under the purview of public institutions (e.g. social work, social 
security or legal institutions). 
 
Three roles are discernible within the generic transactional process: framers, 
administrators and transactors. There may also be a fourth in the form of a 
regulator. 
 
Framers: Framers set the ‘terms of inclusion’, or the transactional blueprint, for 
each transactional process. They set the principles, values, constraints, direction 
or policy parameters of the process. Increasingly, with globalisation, framers 
exist at different societal levels, for example framers at European Union level 
may set the parameters within which nation-state level framers then must 
operate; they do likewise for framers at regional level, etc. Elements of the 
framing process are cascaded down, with room for manoeuvre progressively 
diminishing. Framers may be innovators, but they can equally be guardians of 
the status quo. They determine: 
¾ What currency is to be taken as valid/prioritised for that transaction 
¾ What currency cannot be taken into account 
¾ Who makes the assessment or validates the currency, i.e. who the 
administrators are to be 
¾ How they make the assessment 
¾ The nature of the goods to be allocated, e.g. the quality and quantity 
¾ The form in which goods are to be allocated 
Framers may be politicians, policy-makers, governors, company directors, 
religious leaders, etc. 
 
Administrators: Administrators are responsible for implementing the 
transactional policy devised by the framers. They act as the gatekeepers to 
resources, assessing the currency presented against the criteria for access 
devised by the framers and making decisions on distribution accordingly. 
Administrators include retailers, adjudication officers, social workers, doctors, 
those occupying lower level religious offices, etc. 
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Transactors: Transactors are those people who transact their currencies for 
goods. They may be customers, clients, service-users, claimants, voters, 
passengers, employees, supplicants, etc. 
 
Regulators: Regulators oversee the operation of transactional processes, or the 
operation of particular roles within it, aiming to ensure that the transactional 
blueprint is adhered to. They might be auditors, judges, independent evaluators, 
professional associations, etc.  
 
The people fulfilling the above roles are ‘included’ in the transactional process. 
Others will be excluded because the framers have determined that they cannot 
be considered as potential transactors as they have currencies which ‘invalidate’ 
them, irrespective of any other currencies they may happen to possess (e.g. 
nationality, gender might ‘invalidate’ someone – depending on socio-cultural 
norms and the transaction). They are not accorded ‘membership’: “what we do 
with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices” (Walzer 
1983, p31). Some may have insufficient currency, others may have the required 
currency, but it is not recognised by administrators. Sometimes there may be 
insufficient goods to distribute to those meeting criteria (Williams 1969). Where 
it is not possible to increase production, it is likely that the stringency of the 
currency requirements would be increased (see below). 
 
Roles are not always distinct. Sometimes administrators may also be regulators, 
cast in the dual role of policing transactors and imposing sanctions against 
transgressions, while simultaneously assisting them through the allocation of 
goods, services and/or advice. In some cultures, transactors and/or 
administrators will have an input to framing, either directly or by holding 
framers to account, through the democratic process, an independent media, etc. 
Transactors may also be able – or not – to hold administrators to account, where 
procedures and criteria are open and transparent, and where there is effective 
legal redress. The extent to which framers can hold administrators to account 
may also vary. Some have argued that administrators in the form of ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980) may modify (or reframe) the policy intentions of the 
‘framers’ as they seek to cope with the front-line pressures upon them. In effect, 
policy may be framed ‘bottom-up’. Administrators may also, inadvertently or 
otherwise, apply another set of blueprints derived from other socio-cultural 
understandings, institutional culture or personal experience. Similarly, 
administrators may, or may not, exercise control over transactors, depending on 
such factors as the degree of explicit coercion, or need for the ‘good’ and the 
degree of scarcity of it (see below). In some situations of mutual exchange, 
transactors will also be administrators. Each wants the resources that the other is 
thought to possess and the exchange of resources is contingent on each 
assessing the resources of the other. 
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Depending on the terms of inclusion and constructions of scarcity, the roles and 
powers will be more, or less, self-contained. At one extreme, roles may be 
combined. Alternatively, centralised control may combine framing and 
regulating roles, locating all the power to frame, and all the power to hold others 
accountable, with an elite few. This matters in that being included in the 
transactional process is not necessarily an adequate goal. Without a pluralist 
dissemination of powers, or interaction of different powers (e.g. where framers 
are held to account by transactors who can choose not to transact, or can elect to 
transact elsewhere) and without ‘power dependences’ (where transactors have 
and exchange resources needed by others (Rhodes, 1981)) those included may 
nonetheless be powerless.  
 
4. Currencies and Goods 
INTERCHANGING CURRENCIES AND GOODS  
The terms ‘currency’ and ‘goods’, as employed in this paper, could be 
understood not so much to represent different and distinct types of entity, but 
rather similar types of entity at different stages of the transactional process. 
While this may hold true in some circumstances, it is unsatisfactory as a total 
explanation. Although sometimes what is received as a good may then be re-
used as currency in a subsequent transaction, it will not always be the case that 
currencies and goods are interchangeable. The good received may be consumed 
rather than re-used. Currencies presented are not always literally exchanged for 
a good, and so may not be re-usable as currency. Moreover, it is debatable the 
extent to which some currencies can be acquired through the process of 
transaction.  
 
Material, including financial, resources are certainly one form of currency and 
will be the key currency particularly in free-market transactions. However, for 
citizenship rights or religious-based transactions, other factors will often feature 
in assessments. Not infrequently these cover personal characteristics and 
behaviour, as well as possession of material resources – or lack of them. In as 
much as these too can be the means through which to attract resources or 
‘goods’, it is reasonable also to consider these as currencies. If it is accepted that 
capital can be financial, physical or human, presumably so too will be 
currencies. Yet, does the same apply to ‘goods’ in the way the term is used here? 
Certainly, material resources constitute the usual understanding of ‘good’. And 
the delivery of services, theatrical performances, concerts or football matches 
could arguably be described as ‘behavioural goods’ in as much as access to 
them is likely to be contingent on some form of prior assessment of currency.  
 
Personal characteristics, the third type of currency, include gender, ethnicity, 
physical or mental capacity, sexual orientation and age. They will also be 
defined according to role (mother, employee, carer, etc), geographical location 
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(usual place of residence) and adherence to religious belief systems. Some 
personal characteristics appear more mutable, less intrinsic to the person or 
more subject to external construal and ascription. It seems far-fetched to regard 
personal characteristics such as age, ethnic origin or impairment as ‘goods’ 
acquired through a process of transaction. Yet, the designation and significance 
of personal characteristics may be dependent on the transactional context, how 
the criteria for access are framed and operationalised. While they are not 
literally acquired through transactional processes, personal characteristics are 
construed through the ‘dialogical relations’ (Taylor 1992) that are necessitated 
by engagement, or attempts to engage, in them.  
 
FREE MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
Both the free market and citizenship rights-based transactional processes are 
predicated on the assessment of combinations of material resources, personal 
characteristics, and/or behaviour, and the allocation or distribution of some form 
of good in response. In the free market economy, the currency of money is 
usually exchanged for materials goods. (Exchange of material good for material 
good may also occur, money may be invested and exchanged for more money.) 
The currencies of citizenship rights and associated transactional processes are 
more complex, potentially involving assessments of behaviour and personal 
characteristics, such as nationality. It is debatable whether citizenship rights 
should be seen as ‘currency’, in that they may be the means of obtaining 
resources, or as ‘goods’, in that a transactional process needs to be undergone in 
order to obtain them in the first place. As is often true, the ‘goods’ acquired 
through one transaction then become the ‘currency’ with which to transact 
another.  
 
PRIORITIES AND PATHWAYS 
Society, or rather the socio-cultural understandings of which it is comprised, has 
various dimensions or spheres (Rodgers 1995, Walzer 1983). Transactions of 
one sort or another will occur in economic, social, political, civil and religious 
spheres. Although in many cases the alternative routes of free-market or 
citizenship rights can be expected to apply, not all transactions can be accessed 
by these. In theory, the right to vote could be purchased or be rights-based, as 
could access to health-care or education. Even atonement for sins could be 
secured via payment. How citizenship rights could apply here is more difficult 
to see. Social relationships, friendships and partnerships, are unlikely to be 
accessed via either, although in some cases legal rights and responsibilities may 
be entailed, and marriages may be arranged on the basis of possession of 
material resources. It is also possible that citizenship rights, or permission to 
participate in the ‘free’-market, could be contingent on adherence to a given 
religious creed or political ideology. Currencies will still be required (perhaps 
here primarily behavioural) in order to transact.  
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The importance attributed to each type of good, the eligibility and currency 
requirements for access, the purposes of transaction, all may vary enormously, 
subject to the socio-cultural context and objectives. Nonetheless, within any 
society, it is possible to identify a series of common ‘goods’ that can be 
expected to exist in order to satisfy needs and wants. Such goods include basics 
for survival like food, clothing and housing. Each will have its own associated 
transactional process, but routes to obtaining these may vary, depending on how 
the society is structured. They are likely to be prerequisites for engagement in 
other transactional processes, but may also only be obtainable through 
engagement with others. For example, it may be that financial poverty 
compromises ability to take advantage of educational opportunities. Yet, 
education may be necessary to obtain employment and the latter is likely to be 
an important means of escaping poverty. As previously discussed, possession of 
one sort of good may therefore be necessary to obtain others, i.e. the role of 
‘good’ can shift to that of ‘currency’, or can be the means of acquiring currency. 
The pathways between goods and currencies may be differently configured in 
different socio-cultural contexts. The implication is that failure to have a key 
currency can prevent or impede the acquisition of others, and the ability to take 
advantage of apparent opportunities to acquire them. An appreciation of key 
currencies and transactional pathways in a given society thus becomes critical, 
if effective strategies to address exclusion, and to create genuinely equal 
opportunities, are to be devised.  
 
‘NEGATIVE’ CURRENCIES, GOODS AND TRANSACTIONAL PROCESSES 
Resources in some circumstances may be allocated in response to culturally 
‘undesirable’ personal characteristics, inappropriate behaviours and lack of 
resources, where these are taken to indicate need, desert or threat that requires to 
be contained. To that extent, currencies can be ‘negative’ as well as ’positive’. A 
low income is necessary to receive means tested benefit and health resources 
would logically be targeted on ill-health (broadly speaking). One or 
combinations of negative and positive currencies will be required for 
transaction. That is not to say that successful transaction will always imbue the 
transactor with social status - sometimes quite the opposite.  
 
Conversely, far from attracting resources, in some cases, particular forms of 
currency, e.g. ethnicity in an apartheid system, or nationality, will debar people 
from participating in given transactional processes altogether, whatever other 
currencies they may possess. Citizenship rights, whether civil or social, may be 
restricted on such grounds. Goods too may send out negative messages about 
lack of status, difference and stigma. What people wear, where they live, etc 
may convey information about peer group membership. Conversely, having an 
obvious physical impairment, or a darker skin tone, may stereotypically be 
taken to convey information about lack of material possessions, or behaviours. 
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While a person, or class of person, may be excluded from all transactional 
processes in a given society, exclusion may also result from the stigma 
associated with being obliged to participate in transactions based on ‘negative’ 
currencies, even where these are taken to represent socially sanctioned needs. A 
relationship between individual and society remains - indeed it may be 
experienced as oppressively close - as the administrators of public resources 
monitor shifts in needs and behaviours, and consequent desert.  
 
TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE CURRENCIES AND GOODS 
According to de Soto: “capital is first an abstract concept and must be given a 
fixed, tangible form to be useful.” (2001, p40) and citing Jean Baptiste Say “it is 
not matter which makes capital but the value of that matter, value has nothing 
corporeal about it” (1819, cited in de Soto 2001, p40). Capital of different kinds 
is fixed, and its value rendered tangible, by currencies of material resources, 
behaviour and personal characteristics. Of course, the latter two may or may not 
be witnessed or readily discernible. They may require further transformation to 
render them into tangible human currency, for example, education is represented 
via certificates, or demonstrated via tests; status via new or expensive 
possessions or particular roles, etc. Sometimes administrators may be concerned 
to assess abstract qualities other than value, such as need or desert. They will 
often be obliged to make judgements within a tight time-scale on the basis of 
whatever evidence is visible, or otherwise discernible. We are necessarily 
entering the realms of indicators and symbolism, where material possessions 
and behaviours become conflated with personal characteristics. In other words, 
goods and currencies can be material manifestations or symbolic indicators or, 
more often, both at the same time. They can convey information - and 
misinformation - about identity, such as experience, knowledge, power, status 
and health. They may also be taken as indicators of such concepts as well-being, 
power, nurturing, belief or entertainment. Indeed, the reason the transactor 
wishes to engage in a given transaction may be in pursuit of such goals.  
 
Socio-culturally derived norms, perhaps supported by quantitative research 
describing averages and probabilities, describe likely combinations of 
characteristics, behaviours and levels of material resources. Goods and 
currencies can serve as devices for ‘placing’ people within society, acting as 
indicators of identity. ‘Class’ in Western society constitutes one such 
amalgamation or convergence of various currencies or characteristics, defined 
according to differences in roles, geographical locations and levels of income 
and wealth.  
 
This raises the question of the role and purpose of resources, above and beyond 
the satiation of needs and wants. For example, the possession of an expensive 
house in a good area of town (tangible) could be taken as indicative of the 
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possession of other goods, e.g. well-paid employment, status and well-being. 
Not only will assumptions be made concerning associated goods of different 
types, but of the preceding transactional pathways and currency levels. It could 
thus be taken as indicative of time-based factors, of past wealth and 
employment and the likelihood of these continuing into the future. Finally, 
expectations about personal characteristics of the occupants may be generated, 
perhaps that they are middle-class, white and non-disabled, in view of 
correlations between ethnic origin or disability and poverty. The nature of the 
associations and probabilities will be culturally and societally determined. In 
different socio-cultural understandings, and in different societies, expensive 
housing in a good area of town could signal other associations and transactional 
pathways.  
 
Socio-cultural understandings and expectations thus do not only exist with 
regard to ‘normal’ activities, but also with regard to the symbolic meanings and 
probabilities conveyed by the possession of specific types of resource. Not only 
does the tangible good of ‘housing’ satisfy a basic human need for shelter, but 
also it can be taken as the source of vast quantities of information – and 
misinformation. There are also numerous stereotypical ‘identikits’ founded upon 
conspicuous personal characteristics such as some forms of impairment or skin 
tone. These are taken as indicators of other types of currency, or lack of them. 
Thus someone who is conspicuously physically impaired may be assumed also 
to be poor, unskilled, passive, etc. As will be explored in section 3, such, often 
subconscious, associations may be inaccurate and have exclusionary 
consequences. Even where the required currencies are possessed, they may not 
be discerned by assessors because inaccurate ‘identikits’ intervene. Similarly, 
framers may select criteria for access on the basis of what these are inaccurately 
assumed to indicate. Both the actual criteria, and what they are taken to indicate 
about other aspects of identity, matter for inclusion. Both tangible and 
intangible, manifest and symbolic information (and misinformation) may be 
taken into account.   
 
5. Transactional Infrastructure 
For capital to be converted into tangible currencies, and for it to be transacted 
between different parties requires means of conversion and conveyance. 
According to de Soto “The formal property process created a whole 
infrastructure of connecting devices that, like a railway switchyard, allowed the 
assets (trains) to run safely between people (stations).” (2001, p58). Of course, 
we are concerned here not just with property, but with a range of currencies, 
goods and societal relationships. In all cases, there will need to be mechanisms 
and infrastructures through which transactional relationships can be enacted. 
The following can be identified as key components of usual transactional 
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infrastructure. They will be relevant to many transactional processes, to a 
greater or lesser extent. Each has the potential to exclude:  
 
Institutions: Institutions constitute the major part of the transactional 
infrastructure. Framers and administrators will very often be located in an 
institution of some kind. Some have argued that the culture of the institution, its 
informal, customary ways of operating and understandings, will themselves 
play a role in framing policy (see March and Olsen 1984 on ‘institutionalism’). 
It is thus possible that another set of more localised institutional norms may 
inform framing and assessment procedures. Even where the framing of 
transactions originates elsewhere, criteria and interpretations of them may 
potentially be over-ridden by such institutional norms. 
 
The institutions responsible for framing, administering or delivering 
transactional processes exist at different societal levels. Taken from a UK 
perspective, examples would include: 
¾ Local level: community organisations, local authorities, political 
structures (wards, constituency parties), shops, employers, courts, 
churches/mosques/synagogues 
¾ Regional level: Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, QUANGOs 
associated with Parliaments/Assemblies, political party structures, aspects 
of the judiciary, churches, etc 
¾ National level: U.K. Government and ‘reserved powers’ 
¾ Supranational level: United Nations, multi-national corporations, IMF, 
World Bank, European Union, NATO, religious institutions 
 
A fair amount of institutional infrastructure seems to exist at levels other than 
national, i.e. UK-wide. Even where national Government has reserved powers, 
in areas such as defence or economic policy, the parameters of these powers will 
often be framed by supra-national institutions, of which it will be a member. It 
does not follow that power can be ascertained by the quantity of institutions at 
each level. A lack could be indicative of centralisation of power over a wide 
range of transactional processes, rather than their dissemination to transaction-
specific institutions. 
 
Informal networks: In addition to formal, constitutionally fixed and clearly 
identifiable institutional structures, transactional processes of different kinds 
may occur via informal, fluid, sometimes transient, networks. In UK society, the 
institution of ‘the family’ currently falls somewhere in between, with some of its 
traditional social and economic transactional functions commonly assumed by 
friendship networks and the State. Much has been written on the existence of 
policy communities and networks (e.g. Rhodes 1981, Smith 1993), often 
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forming around a given policy issue. These too are essentially mechanisms for 
transactional processes.  
 
Information and communication infrastructures: People whose first language is 
not that of the dominant culture and those with communication impairments 
will have difficulties accessing communication infrastructures, irrespective of 
their possession of currencies. Some may be inarticulate, or have language 
styles or regional accents which means information conveyed is not heard, not 
understood or simply not well received. An increasing reliance on IT risks 
excluding those without access to the internet, or the education to use it. 
Moreover, to find out about rights, or job availability, requires access to 
information and communication infrastructures (see Gore et al 1995 on the 
importance of literacy in accessing labour markets).  
 
The built environment: The infrastructure of services such as hospitals or 
schools may be unequally accessible not because of explicit rationing processes, 
but because of their location. Thus, the neighbourhoods in which individuals 
live may be critical to accessing basic rights. On a micro-level, the design of 
buildings may render them inaccessible to people with certain forms of 
impairment, providing a serious impediment to inclusion, irrespective of the 
possession of currencies.  
 
Transport: Transport infrastructure may not exist in rural or remote areas. 
Where it does exist, it may be unreliable or unsafe. Design may be inappropriate 
for people with children, elderly people or people with certain forms of 
impairment. There are obvious consequences for inclusion where insufficient 
income or other factors rule out the alternative of a privately owned car.  
 
In addition to exclusion consequent on lack of sufficient or valid currencies, or 
failure to acknowledge them, inadequate transactional infrastructure therefore 
presents another major set of potential barriers. Thus, for example, to be eligible 
for means tested job-seekers allowance, the claimant must have less than a 
certain level of income (material resources), be of working age (personal 
characteristic) and engage in job-seeking activity (behaviour). S/he must also 
have information about their rights, transport to the Jobcentre and access to the 
building (transactional infrastructure). To purchase a Mars Bar requires money 
(material resources) and an accessible shop (transactional infrastructure). To get 
the job in order to earn the money with which to purchase the Mars Bar requires 
access to information concerning job vacancies (transactional infrastructure), 
evidence of employment history (behaviour, skills, knowledge demonstrated by 
tangible goods, e.g. references and certificates) and its acknowledgement by the 
recruiter (administrator). The recruitment process is governed (framed) by anti-
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discrimination legislation, so that certain characteristics are ruled to be 
irrelevant (invalid currency), etc, etc.  
 
Some (but not all) infrastructural barriers may be surmountable if the transactor 
has sufficient currency or status. For example, inaccessible public transport may 
be circumvented if someone has enough money to afford taxis (although taxis 
may also not be accessible or available in remote areas). If the transactor has 
sufficient status – perhaps because they are a visiting Statesman whose first 
language is not English, or an MP with a disability – there will be incentives for 
others to make adjustments in order to promote access.  
 
However, the fact that infrastructure is inaccessible makes it less likely that 
affected transactors will have either the additional currency or high status (with 
obvious implications for inclusion and equal opportunities). It is noticeable that 
material resources, behaviours and personal characteristics are the means, not 
only of participating in transactional processes as transactors but may also be 
determinants of whether a person becomes an administrator or framer. Similarly, 
inaccessible transactional infrastructure could be attributed to such factors, e.g. 
personal characteristics such as physical or sensory impairments, or the use of 
different languages. Status resides not just in the types of transactional process 
engaged with, but in roles within key transactional processes, in particular the 
power to frame. 
 
6. Dynamics 
Transactional processes are largely driven by the dynamics of need, desire, 
scarcity, associated rationing criteria and/or competition. Scarcity can apply at 
any stage of the transactional process. The location of rationing criteria and/or 
competition depends on where the scarcity occurs. The introduction of rationing 
criteria, or more stringent currency requirements, is how competition is usually 
managed. Such processes are discernible both in free market transactions and 
those occurring in the public sector, although motivations, rationing and 
ultimate objectives take different forms. 
 
A shortage of transactors in relation to administrative capacity and/or available 
goods means competition among providers to attract transactors. In effect, roles 
and powers are reversed. Transactors assess which providers best meet their 
criteria, rather than vice versa. Alternatively, a surfeit of transactors means 
competition between transactors for selection by providers. Administrative 
capacity may be insufficient to deliver the quantity of goods to the quantity of 
transactors required.  
 
Of course, scarcity may occur in more than one location, e.g. both goods and 
administrators are scarce, or both transactors and administrators, etc. For ease of 
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illustration, the following table focuses on shortages in just one location at a 
time. In each case, various strategies are logically possible which would have 
the effect of addressing the shortage and regaining an equilibrium. 
 
This table assumes a dynamic movement towards finding an equilibrium 
between transactors, assessment capacity and goods. However, the aim, and 
consequently the dynamics, may be in the opposite direction. The starting point 
may be very unequal; there may be many more transactors seeking goods than 
there are goods available. Indeed, such an underlying imbalance is essential if 
the framers, rather than the transactors, are to exert control. The need or desire 
to acquire the scarce good requires transactors to have certain currency as 
determined by the framers, and to direct their behaviour to that end. Inequality 
can, therefore, be portrayed as “an engine of enterprise, providing incentives for 
those at the bottom as well as those at the top” (Walker, A. 1997, p5). This 
principle does not just apply to capitalist economies, but to whatever is the route 
to acquiring scarce goods in a given society, perhaps as a means of promoting 
conformity as required by the ruling political or religious elite. It also underpins 
the rationing procedures for access to scarce public resources.  
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Table 2: Scarcity at Different Locations and Strategies For Achieving 
Equilibrium 
Currency/ 
Transactors 
Assessment/ 
Administrators 
Goods Strategic adjustment: 
 
− 
 
X 
 
X 
Increase pool of transactors 
♦ Easing of currency requirements 
♦ Policies to increase currency of transactors 
♦ Targeted marketing 
Reduce administrative capacity/production of 
goods 
 
X 
 
− 
 
X 
Increase administrative capacity 
♦ Reduce bureaucracy 
♦ Standardise goods and transactors/currency 
requirements (‘broad classes of people’) 
♦ Increase number of administrators/outlets  
♦ Reduce pool of transactors & production of 
goods 
♦ Increase currency required/production costs 
& quality of goods 
♦ Reduce marketing  
Reduce access to transactional infrastructure 
 
X 
 
X 
 
− 
Increase production of goods 
♦ Reduce production costs and/or quality 
Reduce pool of transactors & administrative 
capacity 
♦ Increase currency requirements 
♦ Increase complexity/bureaucracy of 
assessment procedures 
♦ Reduce access to transactional infrastructure 
 
− = scarce   X = not scarce 
 
It is possible that there may be generic limitations to strategic options for 
adjustment. For example, the nature of the good concerned may make it 
impossible to increase production. It can be argued that positional goods, e.g. 
prestige, power, influence, specialist skills or knowledge, must be logically 
scarce, in that their value as currency would diminish if everyone had an equal 
amount (Williams 1969). Their value and degree of value is predicated on, and 
proportionate to, the existence and degree of inequality, respectively. They 
therefore depend on only a few transactors gaining access. While accepting the 
principle, ways of increasing positional goods through maximising diversity are 
explored in the following section. Similarly, ways must be found to restrict 
access to ‘fortuitously limited goods’, where there is simply not enough to go 
around (Williams 1969). For example, there is a limit to how much land exists, 
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no matter how many developers want to purchase it (see also Hirsch 1997 on 
‘social limits’).  
 
Although an increase in production might be possible, scarcity may be 
constructed in order to meet the objectives of the framers, whether to generate 
profit, or exert control over the behaviour of individuals, rewarding adherence 
to the objectives and norms of the dominant socio-cultural understanding. The 
objectives for transactional processes are not necessarily, therefore, simply to 
serve as mechanisms through which to distribute resources. Primarily they can 
be for managing behaviour in order to achieve a range of possible socio-cultural 
objectives.  
 
7. Scope for Exclusion 
From discussion in this section, it seems exclusion can be attributed to a number 
of causes. There is scope for exclusion at different stages of the transactional 
process. A person may not be accepted as a prospective transactor because they 
may have certain personal characteristics, such as nationality, ethnicity or 
mental ill-health, which invalidate them, irrespective of what other resources 
they may possess. Alternatively, they may simply be found not to have the 
required currency and thus fail to pass the assessment. Or, they may have the 
required currency, yet this is not acknowledged by the administrators, perhaps 
because other blueprints inadvertently intervene, or because resources are not 
made tangible or discernible, or those that are convey misinformation. People 
may be excluded altogether, or they may be engaged in societal relationships 
with institutions or authorities which denote exclusion – most obviously when 
in prison. 
 
The extent to which each party can have an input into the framing process, and 
can hold each to account can also be significant. Transactors may be excluded 
altogether from framing and administration. If so, the nature of the goods, the 
criteria selected and the ways in which they are administered may fail to meet 
the needs of transactors, or result in resources being inaccurately targeted. 
Similarly, without input from administrators, framers may set policies which 
cannot be implemented. Promoting inclusion and accountability would seem 
advisable, not least because without it the framers may not have the necessary 
information to meet their own objectives.  
 
The importance of accessible transactional infrastructure needs to be stressed. It 
can constitute a major barrier to the inclusion of individuals with resources and 
with the capacity to acquire more. Finally, it is possible that exclusion, or the 
threat of it, is a deliberate strategy. Though constructing and managing 
scarcities, framers can promote behaviours which further their preferred socio-
cultural objectives.  
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Section Two: The Social Context 
1. Introduction 
It has been proposed that social context is critical in determining how 
transactions are framed and administered, what transactions, currencies and 
goods are valued, or devalued, and what they symbolise about identity. It is 
reasonable to expect that this will vary; that societies will not always be the 
same in terms of their norms, values and ‘customary activities’. Historically, 
they may have grown from different religious roots, or have been governed 
according to different political ideologies and objectives. They will have 
differing degrees and distributions of power and resource within and between 
them. Expectations may vary about roles, life-styles and opportunities, what 
currencies and goods are acceptable or desirable, what constitutes justice and 
how to enforce it. The social context may, therefore, vary considerably within 
and between societies, communities and institutions. It may also evolve over 
time, perhaps partly consequent on the extent and nature of exposure to other 
norms and objectives, and the dynamics these generate.   
 
If social context is indeed critical in forging the ‘terms of inclusion’ expressed 
through transactional processes, it becomes useful to consider what it is 
comprised of. Given the scope for flux and interchange of a range of norms, 
objectives and understandings, particularly in democratic, multicultural 
societies with devolved institutions, to seek to develop a fixed model of a given 
social context may well prove counter-productive to understanding it. 
Nonetheless, it might be possible to identify the key features that can be 
expected broadly to delineate the social landscape. The geography may be 
contested or, alternatively, uncharted (it can be hard to rise above to get an 
overall picture of a landscape when one is effectively part of it). Differing socio-
cultural understandings of that landscape, or aspirations for it, may become 
discernible. Each understanding, whether implicitly or explicitly, has norms and 
objectives, each accordingly prioritises certain currencies, goods and 
transactional processes, with implications for how identity is defined.  
 
The social context can be broadly conceptualised in terms of competing or 
converging socio-cultural understandings, each comprised of a series of implicit 
or explicitly expressed features (norms, objectives, etc). It is possible that 
different understandings dominate within different communities and institutions. 
This section briefly sets out an attempt to identify what the key features of 
social context might be, how these features might inter-relate and how they 
might influence, or find expression through, the framing and operation of 
transactional processes. It loosely draws on Walzer’s theories (1983) about 
distributional spheres, dominant goods and complex equalities.   
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2. Components of the Social Context 
It is proposed that the prioritisation, framing and operation of transactional 
processes are likely to be strongly influenced, if not explicitly determined, by 
their social context. The following components contribute towards creating the 
social context and expressions of it:   
 
Cultural norms, expectations and aspirations: Traditional norms and values 
about morals, behaviours, roles, etc can be expected to permeate throughout, 
whether or not consciously and explicitly. These can be conceptualised as the 
‘glue’ holding the rest together. It may be hard to disentangle norms, 
expectations and aspirations from objectives and strategies, and discern which 
drives which.  
 
Objectives: Different objectives exist and one or more may be prioritised over 
others. For example, priority may be given to wealth creation, to maximising 
the well-being of the majority or of an elite, or to promoting particular religious 
beliefs and practices. There may be different ways of understanding the 
relationship between objectives, whether one is the means to achieve another, or 
whether one can only be achieved if another is not. 
 
Strategies: Where there is agreement about objectives, views on how best to 
achieve them may nonetheless be very different. For example, is the objective 
of wealth creation most likely to be achieved by freeing the market, or by 
regulating it to prevent corruption and loss of faith in it? Will the well-being of 
the majority be inadvertently promoted by a ‘trickle down’ effect, or by active 
redistribution? By what means should religious beliefs and practices be 
promoted? 
 
Transactional spheres, currencies and goods: Each objective could be 
conceptualised as having a sphere of operation or distribution (Walzer 1983), so 
that for example the objectives concerned with wealth creation are pursued 
through transactions in the economic sphere, those concerned with social 
welfare in the social sphere, etc. Spheres and their transactions may stand alone, 
or be inter-related. Access to the transactional processes within one may, or may 
not, be necessary to gain access (i.e. have the currency) to participate in other 
types of transaction.  
 
Enforcement: Norms, objectives and transactional criteria may be narrowly and 
rigidly enforced, and alternatives repressed. Conversely, alternatives may be 
tolerated, welcomed and ultimately absorbed into an expanded mainstream. 
 
It is proposed that the components of social context can come together in a 
variety of ways to form an understanding of what the terms of inclusion are, or 
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ought, to be. However, this implies a greater degree of rational, conscious 
deliberation than is likely to be the case. Instead, understandings may be riddled 
with contradictions. For example, where the objective is wealth creation, people 
capable of contributing towards it may nonetheless be deemed incapable of 
doing so by virtue of certain personal characteristics (gender, impairment, old 
age). Traditional expectations about norms and behaviours might thus work 
against the achievement of the primary objective.  
 
The social context, particularly its norms and objectives, will be expressed 
through transactional processes, influencing or determining how they are 
framed and prioritised, i.e.: 
¾ Which transactional processes need to be prioritised in order to achieve 
objectives 
¾ Which currencies and goods are to be valued as most relevant to the 
achievement of objectives, and which currencies (particularly behaviours 
and personal characteristics) invalidate the transactor  
¾ How identities are construed, the indicators of identity selected and the 
meanings and values attributed to them 
¾ Who frames, administers and regulates transactional processes 
¾ At which societal levels these occur, how much control over framing is 
exercised at international, national, regional or local level, i.e. how much 
framing is devolved 
¾ The transactional infrastructure deemed to be necessary 
 
In one society, different communities and institutions may develop their own 
norms and objectives. Some aspects of the overall social context and some 
forms of transaction may be common across the board, while other contexts and 
transactions are more specialised or local. The above factors effectively 
constitute the terms of inclusion, whether of national society or particular 
communities. Different socio-cultural understandings will impact differently on 
people with different forms of currency. The following sections consider the key 
components to the social context in more detail. 
 
3. Cultural Norms, Expectations and Aspirations 
Norms may well be undetectable by those who have grown up with them and 
who are unaware of alternatives. For example, assumptions may be made that 
women are only capable of fulfilling certain roles, that people with impairments 
cannot be as economically productive as those without, that people with 
regional accents are naïve, or quaint, or that young black males will exhibit 
criminal behaviour. Norms set societal expectations and ascribe meanings to 
visual and oral indicators. As these are reflected back onto those with certain 
currencies, so the individual’s expectations and consequent aspirations may be 
expected to expand or contract accordingly. Norms, expectations and aspirations 
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may only become apparent once exposure to alternatives has occurred. Only 
then is it likely that people experiencing negative reflections of their identity 
will acquire the confidence to challenge them. 
 
Across a multi-cultural society, norms, expectations and aspirations can be 
expected to vary. So too may objectives and thus the nature of the transactions 
which most explicitly further them. If inclusion means participation in those 
transactions, as a successful transactor, administrator or framer, it is possible 
that definitions of inclusion will also vary. Depending on definitions of 
inclusion, opportunities may not be recognised as such. Even when clearly 
beneficial to the individual, there may be cultural reasons (expectations, 
aspirations, habit) why they are not taken up (Parekh 1997). If definitions of 
inclusion among the populace are highly variable, while the definition favoured 
by the framers is narrow, the latter’s definition may be very different to those of 
people they define as excluded. Policy and practice therefore risk being 
seriously misguided. Measures to tackle social exclusion may in fact be 
measures to coerce conformity, strengthening the dominance of already 
dominant priorities.  
 
Failure to participate in beneficial transactions when the required resources are 
in fact possessed could also be a consequence of the norms of framers and 
administrators, who assume certain characteristics are indicative of a lack of 
capacity. Either way, there is no obvious reason why norms have to be narrow 
and unquestioning. It should be possible for norms to acknowledge diversity, to 
value difference and to challenge assumptions based on appearance. 
 
4. Objectives and Strategies 
Within a given social context, different objectives are possible. Sometimes 
certain objectives, or one objective, may have priority. Sometimes the 
achievement of one or more objectives will be understood to be contingent on 
the achievement, or non-achievement, of others. Such objectives might be 
broadly grouped under different categories. Wealth creation might be an 
economic objective, while social objectives might be concerned with how it is 
distributed in order to promote well-being and minimise inequalities. Political 
objectives might be expressed in terms of ideologies, themselves built around 
the promotion of specified norms and objectives, and how power and input to 
framing is to be distributed. There may be religious objectives, concerned to 
promote a particular belief-set, values and behavioural codes. Underpinning and 
permeating the others, civil objectives promote an understanding of justice, 
what is deemed an appropriate balancing and distribution of freedoms and 
constraints, rights and responsibilities. The overall configuration in any given 
socio-cultural understanding varies according to the hinterland of norms and 
traditions - indeed it could be taken as expressive of that hinterland. 
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To a greater or lesser degree, objectives in each category can be expected to 
feature in any socio-cultural understanding. Some may be seen as ends and 
others as means to achieving those ends. They might be led by political or, 
religious ideology, the goal of wealth creation or of maximising social welfare. 
Theoretically, one of these could subjugate or subsume others. For example, 
religion might not be concerned with political ideology or wealth creation, or 
even regard these as undermining its tenets. The drive to create wealth might 
eclipse other objectives, or political ideology might be devoted to facilitating 
wealth creation. A concern for maximising social welfare might be the declared 
primary objective, under the guise of which political, economic or religious 
objectives acquire credibility. The generation of income and wealth may be seen 
as the best way to promote well-being, or vice versa. It is hard to conceive of 
justice independently of other objectives. Judgements about the appropriate 
balance of freedoms and constraints must surely be relative, i.e. what is deemed 
‘appropriate’ varies, depending on other objectives and underpinning norms. 
The realisation of civil objectives seems likely to be led by others, rather than to 
lead others.  
 
It may be that there is agreement about the desirability of certain objectives, yet 
fundamental disagreement about the ways in which objectives are most likely to 
be achieved. Alternatively, the efficacy of a strategy might not be in dispute, e.g. 
where jobs are shed in order to boost profitability, yet the consequences of 
pursuing it may be deemed socially unacceptable. The strategy pursued towards 
the objective of wealth creation in this example is judged to have a negative 
impact on objectives for well-being. There may also be differences of views 
about time-scales: an effective long-term strategy might have undesirable short-
term consequences (as governments have sometimes argued when imposing tax 
hikes), or a short-term strategy might have undesirable long-term consequences. 
 
Why does this matter when it comes to maximising the inclusion of diversity? 
The extent to which differing objectives are, or are perceived to be, mutually 
and unavoidably exclusive determines the varieties of socio-cultural 
understandings that can co-exist, and the extent of choice about routes to 
inclusion available within any one socio-cultural context. Areas of 
incompatibility might be found within categories of objectives (e.g. 
diametrically opposed political ideologies such as democracy and dictatorship) 
or across categories (e.g. religious ideology dictates that wealth creation is 
sinful). Notwithstanding that some configurations will be inherently 
incompatible, this could be taken to suggest that in maximising inclusion of 
diversity through widening the mainstream, the aim should be to accommodate 
as many objectives as possible. If diversity is to be valued rather than merely 
tolerated, then different objectives and configurations of objectives would need 
to be seen as mutually supporting. This is not to advocate ‘difference-blindness’ 
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(Taylor 1992), but to suggest that a closer examination of supposed 
incompatibilities might reveal previously unimagined similarities and benefits, 
or at least scope for co-existence. While there may be disagreements about 
objectives and strategies, and these may be logically mutually exclusive, it will 
not always be impossible for differences to be accommodated. Indeed, in a 
democracy, exposure to alternatives should be regarded as healthy.  
 
5. Transactional Spheres, Currencies and Goods 
This section gives a brief summary of some complex arguments, which would 
benefit from more detailed exploration than is possible here. As suggested 
above, it may make sense to group different types of transactions around the key 
socio-cultural objectives which they help to meet. Building on Walzer’s 
description of ‘distributional spheres’ (1983), it is possible that transactions 
could broadly be grouped into their respective ‘transactional spheres’. Particular 
currencies may be associated with each sphere, or with key transactions in each, 
i.e. it may be appropriate to meet different types of objective.  
 
In some cases, spheres, or transactions, are ‘free-standing’ in that currencies 
which grant access to others, do not or should not apply to these. For example, 
in a democratic society, it is generally accepted that political power, or control 
of framing (political sphere) should not be accessed by, or proportionate to, 
possession of income and wealth (economic sphere). Currencies have value for 
some purposes and not for others: “There are different companies – the strong, 
the handsome, the intelligent, the devout – and each man reigns in his own, not 
elsewhere…make the mistake of each aiming for universal dominion. Nothing 
can win, not even strength, for it is powerless in the kingdom of the wise.” 
(Pascal, translator J.M. Cohen, cited in Walzer 1983, p18). 
 
Difficulties arise when one good (or currency) dominates or usurps the rightful 
role of others. Walzer defines a dominant good as one where “individuals who 
have it, because they have it, can command a wide range of goods.” (1983, 
p10). It becomes a currency which can traverse the boundaries of different 
spheres and transactions. If financial wealth is a truly dominant good (or rather 
occupying the role of currency as described in this paper) then it could be used 
to acquire political power, civil freedoms and ecclesiastical office. It becomes 
the means of acquiring key goods associated with other spheres and objectives. 
Yet, according to Walzer, “no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to 
one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with 
regard to some other good.” (1983, p19). If spheres are autonomous of each 
other, “inequality will not be multiplied through the conversion process.” 
(Walzer 1983, p17). Thus, not all are included in everything, but each could 
have an equally valued place. This is described by Walzer in terms of ‘complex 
equality’.  
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This can be illustrated by taking the example of financial currency, i.e. money. 
As a currency or indicator it has a number of advantages. It is usable in a vast 
array of transactions involving material goods, and it is reusable for other such 
transactions. It provides a commonly understood and consistent basis for 
expressing value. Assessment is straightforward and can be very precise - it is 
easily quantifiable. It also allows for adjustments to be made in order to 
stimulate or restrict demand. Where the objective is the acquisition or 
distribution of material goods in order to make a profit, money is a useful 
currency! However, not all transactions have such objectives. The fact that a 
person has money indicates nothing about their integrity, capacity to benefit 
from education, physical strength, altruism, etc. Yet integrity may be the 
relevant quality to gauge when it comes to meeting the objective of 
appropriately distributing political office, or capacity to benefit from education 
when it comes to distributing educational resources, etc. The possession of 
financial currency is an unreliable indicator of human capital. The fact that 
human currency may be more difficult to assess does not make financial 
currency an adequate proxy-indicator.  
 
While retaining the notion of the range of different broad macro-level socio-
cultural objectives such as wealth creation or adherence to a religious code, and 
the likelihood that different types of currency will be required to meet each, at a 
micro level, a variety of transactions may occur in each sphere. Each may have 
its own particular objective, goods and currency requirements. For example, 
human currencies, like evidence of work-related skills and experience, as well 
as financial currency, may all have a role to play in furthering the goal of wealth 
creation. Social welfare transactions have value to the extent that good housing, 
health, etc. are necessary for wealth creation, and civil or legal transactions in as 
much as they are necessary to promote confidence in contracts. Religious or 
spiritual objectives may be less relevant (although adherence might become a 
proxy-indicator of ‘membership’, i.e. legitimate transactor status or otherwise, 
for the purposes of economic transactions). A hierarchy of transactions and 
currencies emerges, according to the extent each is deemed to be relevant to 
wealth creation. The economic sphere expands to encompass others. Yet other 
macro-level objectives, transactions and currencies, may be worthwhile for 
reasons other than wealth creation – in fact wealth creation may be the means of 
achieving others (e.g. social welfare), implying a different structure to the 
hierarchy.  
 
In order to maximise scope for the (uncoerced) inclusion of diversity, the aim is 
to find structures in which different currencies can have equal value, i.e. are 
recognised as having equal importance. While qualities such as physical 
strength and intelligence (as per the quote above) are not the same, they may 
nonetheless make an equal contribution towards fulfilling equally important, if 
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different, objectives. Rather than any ‘kingdom’ or society being built on just 
one, it is likely that a range of qualities or currencies will be required to fulfil a 
range of objectives. Neither is it the case that a person will necessarily only 
possess one quality or currency. They may be both physically strong and 
intelligent, although the presence of one clearly cannot be taken to indicate the 
presence of the other! As will be explored in section 3, identities and hence 
currencies are multi-faceted, even though on occasions assumptions based on 
narrow norms may mean that the presence of one characteristic obscures the 
existence of others.  
 
While it may be true that a specific type of currency may be necessary to meet a 
given objective, it does not follow that a currency can only be appropriate to 
meet one given objective. Currencies can be both specific and multi-purpose. 
Difficulties arise, not because currencies can be multi-purpose, but when one 
becomes so to the exclusion of others – accelerating the social mobility of those 
with it and excluding those without it. Qualities such as intelligence, strength, 
integrity, capacity to learn, etc. may well have a role to play in meeting 
economic, social, and other objectives. This opens up options for inclusion in 
the different spheres, potentially providing inclusion into all societal dimensions 
and promoting social mobility, even if it remains the case that certain currencies 
are likely to be particularly associated with a given macro-level objective and its 
transactional sphere. However, not all currencies are ‘mutable’ (particularly 
personal characteristics like ethnicity, age or impairment) and some transactions 
and currencies will be very specialised.  
 
If the aim is to promote inclusion into all societal dimensions, it would seem to 
follow that the most conducive structure is likely to be one which endorses and 
values as important different macro-level objectives rather than just one and 
which acknowledges that a range of currencies and transactions are required in 
order to meet each. Norms need to acknowledge that people have various 
currencies and avoid making stereotypical judgements on the presence or 
absence of others, based on evidence of one. The currencies selected to meet 
transactional objectives need to be logically appropriate as indicators for 
making judgements about appropriate distribution. A further implication might 
be that competition for one good becomes dissipated as different goods are 
equally and commonly valued. In contrast to the notion that diversification or 
the provision of alternatives creates competition, providing all have equal value, 
the opposite must be true. Moreover, in a social context in which equal value is 
placed on different currencies and goods, and on participation in different 
transactional processes, inequality with regard to any one is less likely to be 
indicative of exclusion overall.  
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6. Dynamics 
The social context can be expected to be more or less dynamic, depending on 
such factors as perceived or actual inconsistencies between and within socio-
cultural understandings – between declared objectives and strategies for 
implementing them, differing priorities for objectives or views on ways to 
achieve them, struggles for redistribution of power and resources, or recognition 
of resources, and of the criteria for framing transactions. The more restrictive in 
terms of the objectives and resources valued, and the more unequal the 
distribution of those resources, the greater those dynamics would logically be. 
Similarly, in a multi-cultural society, where different socio-cultural 
understandings co-exist and find expression, the interaction between them 
would engender a series of dynamics. These may also be externally generated. 
An awareness of alternatives, through drawing comparisons with others within 
or beyond the community in question, might engender a ‘dialogical relationship’ 
(Taylor 1992) through which communities as well as individuals comprehend 
and question their identities.  
 
Dynamics may be towards convergence, or divergence. Friction may be 
expressed, insecure identities shored up and status reinforced by focusing on 
obvious or superficial differences. Conversely, by investigating and 
acknowledging similarities and learning about other norms and customs, new 
insights may be gained, and shifts occur in understanding, aspirations and 
practices. Of course, sometimes alternatives can be mutually exclusive, such as 
where the fulfilment of one objective, or pursuance of one strategy, precludes 
others. While there may be fears that acknowledging difference may generate 
destructive dynamics, so too can the failure to address it. There is no obvious 
reason why the misrecognition of identity (Taylor 1992) and resulting 
oppression should not apply to communities as well as to individuals.  
 
If the aim is for inclusion, then a positive approach is clearly required towards 
diversity and the challenges to accepted norms and understandings that can 
ensue upon exposure to alternatives. Where adjustments to the social context 
result, this may be expressed in terms of which or how many forms of 
transactional processes are valued, and/or adjustments to access criteria. The 
redrafting of terms of inclusion re-shapes the social mainstream, and redraws 
boundaries between inclusion and exclusion. An appreciation of such dynamics 
should therefore be helpful to managing the inclusion of diversity.  
 
DYNAMICS BETWEEN DIFFERENT SOCIETAL LEVELS  
Boundaries may exist not just between types of transaction or spheres, in that 
goods and currencies are not convertible between them, but also between 
societal levels – supranational, national, regional and local. These can be used 
as boundaries to grant or deny access. Their boundaries remain important 
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contributors to the drafting of terms of inclusion, and in generating dynamics 
when exclusion is contested. It is possible to be excluded from transactions 
relating to one sphere and not others, depending on societal level. For example, 
it is possible to purchase goods irrespective of area of residency, but not to stand 
for election as a Councillor, except in the area where one lives or works. 
 
Institutions associated with each sphere may exist at different societal levels. As 
previously suggested (see section 1, sub-section 5) each may have its own 
culture, accepted and unquestioned ways of operating, etc. Their existence at 
different levels also provides a focus for locating socio-cultural understandings 
and/or the development of counter-cultures. Cultural factors shaping aspirations 
and expectations about inclusion may be very localised. The social context 
pertaining to the immediate surrounding community may be more significant to 
inclusion or exclusion, rather than the wider context of ‘society’. Each 
community may have their own localised culture and competing counter-
cultures. Additionally, there may be cultural clashes or mismatches between 
societal levels. 
 
To accommodate diversity ‘vertically’, it is possible that broad parameters for 
framing are set at international level, and are progressively narrowed by framers 
at each lower societal level. This allows for some degree of flexibility, while 
ensuring some unifying similarities to the social context. Of course, how much 
is to be delegated may be contested, and there may be friction created between 
the differences that anyway ensue (e.g. pressures to change Westminster policy 
following the Scottish Parliament’s introduction of free personal care for older 
people). Dynamics may not just be ‘horizontal’, i.e. between different norms 
and objectives at the same societal level, but ‘vertical’ between them at different 
levels. Taken to the extreme, it might be possible to confine (perceived or 
actually) incompatible differences to particular geographical areas, each with 
their own set of framing and administering institutions. However, this ceases to 
be a mechanism for accommodating diversity and becomes a means of 
excluding it from the mainstream. 
 
DYNAMICS BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPINGS 
As discussed, different social contexts may prioritise different objectives and 
associated transactional processes, requiring different amounts and types of 
currency. Each may therefore impact differently on people depending on their 
personal characteristics, where these are relevant to access criteria. For example, 
Oliver (1990) has argued that the oppression experienced by disabled people is 
related to the structuring of capitalist society and its treatment of those 
considered economically unproductive. Thus, in a society where the dominant 
norms and objectives decree inclusion via paid work, exclusion must result 
where immutable inflexibilities in the labour market (availability of jobs or 
  
38 
certain types of jobs) intersect with immutable personal characteristics. 
However, some assumed immutable inflexibilities in the environment (in this 
example, the labour market) may be nothing of the kind. It may be entirely 
possible to reorganise the job, its hours and location of work to accommodate 
people with a wider range of personal characteristics. Here the aim of including 
diversity leads to examination and adjustments to the terms of inclusion. But is 
it inevitable that inclusion must be achieved through paid work? Could the 
designation of only one route to inclusion itself be described as discriminatory? 
In a social context which valued a range of objectives and forms of societal 
relationships, more options for inclusion would result. Any immutable 
inflexibilities with regard to just one should have less significant repercussions 
for exclusion. 
 
The persistent exclusion of people with particular personal characteristics can 
lead to the birth of movements based on those personal characteristics, such as 
the women’s, black or disability movements. These aim to achieve shifts in the 
social context, whether to change objectives and norms, or to increase access 
through challenging failure to recognise resources, or to change the priority 
accorded to key transactional processes. This engenders new forms of social 
organisation, founded on shared experience, associated with a characteristic, 
such as impairment, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, age, role, activity, 
currency, or locality. However, while exclusion may have generated their 
existence, such groupings can themselves become exclusive.  
 
If it is indeed the case that people who are excluded will be impelled to develop 
oppositional counter-cultures, it follows logically that exclusion from all 
groupings or cultures would be impossible. By the same token, where 
communities exist in opposition to each other, inclusion in all becomes logically 
impossible. In some cases, exclusion from one community can automatically 
bring inclusion into another. Even those whom society purposefully excludes 
through imprisonment may be part of a community, with a hierarchy, 
behavioural norms, status symbols, etc. If exclusion can promote certain forms 
of participation through restricting others, the issue becomes less about whether 
inclusion occurs and more a matter of inclusion in what, and the associated 
value judgements.  
 
However, for counter-cultures to take shape, and groupings to form, 
communicational and organisational infrastructure is required. Total exclusion 
may arise in the form of isolation ensuing when infrastructure does not permit 
shared characteristics to be recognised and organisation to occur. For example, 
the removal of rights to freedom of association is one way the development of 
counter-cultures may be inhibited. 
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MANAGING DYNAMICS 
If power is disseminated through democracy, the social context is likely to be 
contested and fluid, as attempts are made to render social arrangements both 
coherent and advantageous from the perspectives of people who are differently 
placed. Where power is concentrated in the hands of an undemocratically 
appointed elite, and the one perspective is imposed, any incoherence or 
inconsistencies cannot so readily be challenged. Rigidity ensues, if it is assumed 
that different perspectives continue to exist but are prevented from finding 
expression. To promote sustainability, existing alternative perspectives need to 
be repressed, while the development of new ones is to be avoided. However, the 
advent of new infrastructures such as IT, satellite television and global transport 
systems would seem to make it increasingly hard to control the flow of 
alternatives. The latter in particular may also increase the likelihood of multi-
culturalism within a given society.  
 
If such factors have indeed increased the likelihood of exposure to diversity, the 
question of how to respond becomes more pressing. Broadly, the options are to 
redraft the terms of inclusion in order to widen the mainstream, to introduce 
new clauses providing specific provision for people with certain characteristics, 
or seek to oppress diversity into homogeneity. Either ‘adjustments’ are made to 
the social context, or to those whom it does not accommodate. Those who 
cannot or will not adjust, those whose differences are not recognised or deemed 
sufficiently important to merit a response, are excluded – at least from approved 
society.  
 
If a very restrictive limited society becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, so 
too may be one which allows for the inclusion of inherently, fundamentally and 
unavoidably contradictory alternatives. Destructive dynamics may be generated 
by enforced tolerance of contradictory diversity as much as by enforced 
intolerance of non-contradictory diversity. This signals that successfully to 
maximise inclusion of diversity requires clarity as to where alternatives must be 
logically mutually exclusive, and where this is so significant as to undermine 
the fundamental tenets of the terms of inclusion. The gap between perceived and 
actual contradictions may be extensive, or take a different shape to that initially 
assumed. Of course, an artificial ascription of incompatibility may not 
necessarily be the inadvertent outcome of unthinking prejudice. It may be 
motivated by responses to (actual or perceived) scarcity and the consequent 
need to establish restrictive criteria for access in order to assert or defend 
claims, the desire to shore up insecure identities or distract attention from chaos 
within by focusing on the threat without, and so on.  
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7. Scope for Exclusion 
In the course of considering what the components of the social context might be 
and its dynamics, it has been possible to identify different forms of inclusion 
and exclusion.  
  
In a complex society, which accommodates and values a range of objectives and 
associated resources, where powers are disseminated to institutions at different 
societal levels, the terms of inclusion may vary. Within each setting, individuals 
may be more, or less, powerful. They may have more, or less, opportunities to 
transact. Although, as discussed above, absolute exclusion from a given setting 
or grouping is possible, inclusion or exclusion from society overall may perhaps 
be better understood as a matters of degree. In a society made up of different 
communities and institutions, an individual may have access to transactions 
emanating from some but not others. An individual may be more, or less, 
connected to different communities and more, or less, included in the network 
of transactions valued by their society. An individual’s degree of inclusion into 
society can be understood in relation to that network – the extent to which they 
are enmeshed in it and what power or capacity they have with regard to each 
transaction. Instead of plotting positions along a two dimensional line or 
spectrum from exclusion to inclusion (or poor to rich), inclusion can be 
conceptualised as ‘three dimensional’ – or perhaps four dimensional if seen as a 
dynamic process, changing over time.  
 
Social arrangements are likely to be under constant challenge, buffeted by 
pressures both external and internal. The implications for inclusion depend to 
some extent not just on what the dominant socio-cultural norms and objectives 
are, but how rigidly they are enforced. If it is narrowly constructed around one 
objective and dominant currency or good, the type of societal relationship 
valued and the options for inclusion will be similarly narrow. Where a priori 
distribution of the dominant currency/good is inequitable, pressures to widen 
the terms of inclusion can be expected to be intense. Unless repressed (overtly 
or covertly), this may result in the generating or reinforcement of alternative 
world views and cultures. Conformity is the only route to inclusion. Even here, 
those with the dominant good may be expected to defend their privileged status, 
through increasing currency requirements. Scarcity is the reason for exclusion, 
while the management of scarcity can be both the route to promoting 
conformity, and of maintaining the status quo.  
 
This raises the question of the extent to which misrecognition of identity can be 
attributed to the desire to defend claims to dominant currencies and goods. An 
acknowledgement of sameness may undermine arguments for inequitable 
distribution, where distribution hinges on possessing that particular currency. 
Those with a disproportionate amount of the dominant currency may have a 
  
41 
vested interest in misrecognising it in others, or misrecognising the capacity of 
others to acquire it. Yet, if the dominance of one type of currency or good is not 
inevitable, competition is reduced. Different currencies have value, and 
pressures to misrecognise are dissipated. The social context may thus have 
implications for how many or few forms of societal relationships are to be 
valued, for understandings of identity and consequently who is, and who is not, 
to be included in what.   
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Section Three: Identity 
1. Introduction 
In order to enact societal relationships, the respective parties need to be able to 
‘place’ each other, in terms of their roles, currencies and goods. Framers, 
administrators and transactors at different levels and perhaps operating in 
different spheres, all need to be able to make assessments about the identity of 
each other. The construal and misconstrual of identity is likely to be determined 
by the social context, the prevailing norms and objectives, the purpose of 
assessment, its criteria and the quality of its currency/identity indicators. It may 
also be influenced by a genuine scarcity of resources, (i.e. where this cannot be 
addressed by increasing production), or by the desire of those with valued 
resources to defend their privilege.  
 
It is important to make accurate assessments of identity – to inform the 
appropriate distribution of resources and to identify and, where possible, avoid 
risk. Yet, the minute scrutiny of large numbers of people over a prolonged 
period of time is unlikely to be possible. Therefore, it becomes imperative to 
find reliable short-cut indicators with which to ‘place’ people, or assess them 
against transactional blueprints. Not only will the prioritisation of certain 
resources or characteristics be socio-culturally determined, so too will be the 
indicators; the same indicator having the potential to have different meanings in 
different social contexts. 
 
Relationships and communications between and at different societal levels, and 
between those occupying different roles, are likely to serve different purposes, 
probably for each party. The greater the distance, or more rapid the assessment, 
the less can be discerned and the greater the scope for misunderstandings. 
Details, nuances and subtleties must be dispensed with. Either way, the purpose 
for selection needs to be established, relevant currencies prioritised and 
indicators ascribed. As discussed in section 1, sub-section 4, above, currency 
(personal characteristics, behaviour and possessions) can serve, not just as the 
practical means through which goods are acquired or denied, but as symbolic 
indicators of identity.   
 
While it is hard to see how reliance on indicators of identity can be avoided, the 
danger with short-cuts is that they lead to inaccuracies. There may be trade-offs 
between accuracy and speed. Indicators may be based on false assumptions, or 
on probabilities which lead crucial contradictory evidence to be overlooked. 
Transactions are framed and assessed without full cognizance of the potential 
for capacity. The failure to transact provoked by inaccessible transactional 
infrastructure may be wrongly attributed to a lack of capacity to transact. The 
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misrecognition of identity is a major form of discrimination, in turn resulting in 
exclusion. 
 
2. The Importance of Context and Perspective 
As discussed in section two, differing social contexts can be expected to impact 
differently on people with different characteristics or resources. Depending on 
the objectives, values and norms and how tightly terms of inclusion are drawn 
and enforced, characteristics or resources will be judged useful, normal or 
otherwise. Identity and status will be implicitly or explicitly determined against 
such benchmarks. Different benchmarks will thus lead to different 
understandings about the identity and status of others. The social context is 
critical, either allowing capacity to find expression (see Gershuny 1998), 
preventing its expression, or creating incapacity.  
 
The social model of disability (e.g. Oliver 1990, Oliver 1996, Barnes et al 1999) 
means the collective identity of physically impaired people or, indeed, impaired 
people more generally, can be located in the shared experience of the impact of 
discrimination. Oliver offers the following definition of disability: “the 
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social 
organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical 
impairments and thus excludes them from the mainstream of social activities” 
(UPIAS 1976, cited in Oliver 1990, p11).  
 
Disability could therefore be understood as synonymous with discrimination 
and resulting exclusion. Although here it is on the basis of physical impairment, 
there is no obvious reason why, in principle, a failure to take into account other 
forms of impairment or other personal characteristics could not also literally 
result in disability. Oliver (1990) further relates the oppression experienced by 
disabled (impaired) people to the structuring of capitalist society and its 
treatment of those considered economically unproductive.  
 
Disabled people, denied their civil right of freedom of movement, any evidence 
of their capacity obscured by apparent evidence of incapacity, find themselves 
barred from access to key economic transactions, particularly employment and 
earned income. Adjustments to terms of inclusion could be made in one of two 
ways – by accentuating difference through ‘special’ additional measures, or by 
removing difference through amending mainstream provision. It would be 
possible to introduce ‘special’ buses specifically designed for wheelchair users, 
or to redesign all buses so that wheelchair users can be accommodated; to allow 
flexible working patterns for workers more generally, or just for the few. In the 
absence of such adjustments, disabled people are compensated (poorly) via 
social ‘welfare’ rights to social security. However, the nature and traditional 
structure of welfare provision for disabled people, the power of professionals 
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over their lives, segregated educational, health and care institutions, can further 
erode civil rights and access to key transactions (Oliver 1996). Welfare 
dependency is not necessarily an inevitable consequence of impairment, but of 
society’s failure to accommodate it, and the nature of its response to it. 
  
Malik (1996) discusses race as conceptualised either in terms of biological 
differences or as a social construct (note the similarities with the discourse of 
medical and social models which prevails in the field of disability). He observes 
that “Race accounted for social inequalities by attributing them to nature.” 
(1996, p6). Social differences thus become ‘natural’. Interestingly, he too 
locates the rise of racism within the context of the divisions created by capitalist 
society. The relationship between culture and race is also discussed, suggesting 
that racial ideologies permeate both structural and cultural levels. At a personal 
level, Malik comments that “On meeting a fellow human being there are a 
variety of ways we can respond” (1996, pp 5,6). This is eloquently expressed by 
Stocking (also cited in Malik 1996):“On meeting antipodal man one could 
marvel at his fundamental likeness to oneself or one could gasp at his 
immediately striking differences. One could regard these differences as of 
degree or of kind, as products of changing environment or immutable heredity, 
as dynamic or static, as relative or absolute, as inconsequential or hierarchical. 
Considered in these terms, polygenist thinking did not die with Darwin’s Origin 
of Species, nor is it entirely dead today.” (1982, p45). The characteristics taken 
as indicators of such manifestations of difference, and how these relate to 
‘classes of people’ (Banton 1994), are not, however, discussed.  
 
This approach is in keeping with the theory that the nature of exclusion is 
determined by the socio-cultural structuring of society. In addition, as explored 
below, the attitudes and actions of individual assessors can intervene at a 
personal level. This is consistent with Thompson’s analysis of discrimination at 
structural, cultural and personal levels, (1998), if somewhat differently framed 
here. 
 
Identities, and associated labels, may be imposed by the dominant majority or 
they may be self-defined. The distinction is not always clear-cut. How is it 
possible for an individual to define their identity without reference to the wider 
context? To what extent can someone who is part of a culture see themselves 
objectively from it? Identity cannot, therefore, exist in isolation. It needs to be 
continuously communicated to be affirmed. This can be seen as a circular 
process, whereby an individual seeks to communicate their identity to others, 
and understands their identity by the ways in which others reflect it back (Taylor 
1992). The nature of the response may encourage the individual to modify, 
where possible, either their characteristics or the means of conveying them.  
 
  
45 
People may gain strength from believing that what is imposed was in fact 
chosen, i.e. they anyway reject the society that rejects them. As discussed in 
section 2, sub-section 6 above, this can give rise to the development of counter-
cultures and a new set of values, where what in one culture is deemed negative 
becomes positive currency; what in one invalidates the transactor, in another is 
the passport to membership of a community. 
 
3. Components of Identity 
Any individual will possess a range of characteristics which locate them within 
transactional processes, spheres and levels. Identity is not one-dimensional, but 
multi-dimensional, including characteristics which are collective, role-related 
and/or changeable over time.  
 
Individual characteristics could include: 
¾ Characteristics associated with the possession of currencies 
¾ Roles within different transactions and transactional spheres – n.b. 
different roles may well apply in different transactions – or it may be that 
framers ‘cluster’ 
¾ Component parts of individual identity may exist at different levels, i.e. 
societal, organisational, community, neighbourhood, family 
 
Collective or commonly held characteristics may be based on: 
¾ Identification with a particular socio-cultural understanding of approved 
norms and objectives 
¾ One or more shared individual characteristic (role, experience, resource 
level or type) within a specific socio-cultural setting, sphere or level  
¾ One or more shared individual characteristics across different socio-
cultural settings, spheres or levels 
  
The process whereby individual characteristics become recognised as shared 
characteristics, may give rise to the emergence of classes of people, movements 
or counter-cultures, with objectives and norms of their own, against which to 
assess similarities and differences. Relationships may, therefore, not just be 
‘vertical’, i.e. along the transactor/administrator/framer, or local/national/supra-
national axis’s, but also ‘horizontal’, e.g. between transactors or between 
framers, or between those at the same societal levels, etc. They may be based on 
the fact that those involved share the same level or type of resource, or on 
‘power dependences’ (Rhodes 1981), where each has resources that the other 
needs, or one has resources needed by the other. Any may form the basis for 
assessment and transaction. There will often be a mixture of all of these. The 
greater the diversity of types of relationships, and of characteristics and 
resources valued, the richer and more cohesive the society is likely to be 
(particularly where these cross socio-cultural boundaries) and the more that the 
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society has successfully managed to include diversity. Where relationships are 
possible only among people with shared characteristics, and where socio-
cultural understandings and priorities are deemed incompatible, the result will 
be what the report into racial disturbances in Summer 2001 (Cantle 2001) 
termed ‘parallel lives’, but in a socio-cultural rather than merely geographical 
sense.  
 
Components to identity may be multiple at any and all levels, resulting in a 
network of relationships through which overall identity is understood, and 
through which inclusion may be achieved. Some component parts of identity 
may be transient, others are immutable, some chosen (or deemed so) or 
deserved, others not. This may have a significant impact on the type of attitude 
provoked, whether condemnatory or sympathetic, compliant or challenging. 
 
4. Assessments, Attitudes and Actions 
In view of the differing natures and purposes of transactional relationships, it is 
logical that assessments too will have different objectives, and that subsequent 
responses will take different forms.  
 
For example, in order to ensure that resources are allocated as intended, it is 
necessary for administrators to be able to make sound judgments about the 
capacity of the prospective transactor. Particularly where transactions are 
designed to equalize through redressing imbalances, there may well be concerns 
to establish ‘desert’, i.e. whether the transactor is responsible for their 
disadvantage and the extent to which they can assume responsibility for 
redressing it. Administrators also need to establish whether the capacity and the 
agency of the transactor (or respective lack of them) is likely to be, or can be, 
directed in accordance with the approved norms, objectives and strategies, or 
whether they risk constituting a threat to them.  
 
The transactor too needs information about the administrator, who the 
administrator is, their powers and the assessment criteria and procedures to be 
employed. They also need to be able to judge whether the goods to which they 
grant access are likely to meet their objectives, and identify risks that they will 
not. There may be risks too that the currency requirements are too great, or 
assessment procedure too arduous, perhaps requiring the transactor to make 
unacceptable changes to behaviour. Assessment is thus a two-way process, as 
indeed is the transactional relationship itself. Depending on the location of 
scarcity (see section 1, subsection 6), the judgement of the administrator or of 
the transactor carries more weight. Depending too on the power balance 
between the two, different strategies may be available by way of response.     
 
  
47 
Whatever the precise objectives of the assessment, or the perspective of the 
party concerned, it is possible to identify three common areas for assessment. 
Depending on other factors, judgements about these may serve different 
purposes: 
 
Judgement about degree of capacity: e.g., what resources the person has, and 
their potential to acquire more.  
 
Judgement about degree of agency: e.g., whether the person has control over 
how their resources are used or allocated, whether they can be taken to be 
responsible for their resources, or lack of them, whether they can assume 
responsibility to redress their disadvantage.  
 
Judgement about degree of threat, or the opposite: how/if capacity is likely to 
be used and what negative or positive outcomes may ensue.  
 
It is suggested that responses to these will vary, depending on power 
relationships and whether or not there is choice about engagement in the 
transaction. Transaction is likely to be unavoidable when it is the means of 
meeting basic needs, or where conformity is directly imposed. Incentives to 
acquire capacity, assume agency and direct it positively (i.e. in accordance with 
approved socio-cultural objectives) may all be achieved through constructions 
of scarcity, and currency criteria focusing on behaviour.   
 
Judgements (or misjudgements) may be made with regard to these separately, 
but seem more likely to be made in combination. An assessment of one 
immediately begs questions about the others, e.g. in Western culture degrees of 
capacity and agency may typically be expected, or required, to go together. 
Threat may ensue either from negatively directed capacity and agency (i.e. 
contrary to approved norms, etc.), or the potential drain on others’ resources, 
where the individual has neither capacity nor agency and thus responsibility for 
them falls elsewhere. In other cultures, the exercise of individual agency may 
itself be viewed as threatening, and this threat increases proportionate to 
capacity.  
 
In combination, depending on the context, these three judgements could give 
rise to a range of other judgements about the individual, such as her/his worth, 
power, neediness, desert or predictability. For example, if a person is poor or 
without skills (i.e. lacks capacity) but it is not deemed to be their fault and they 
cannot reasonably be expected to improve their situation (i.e. lacked and 
continues to lack agency), they might be judged both needy and deserving. If 
they are needy, but did or do have agency, their desert might become 
questionable. Judgements would also need to be made about whether the wider 
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repercussions of allocating goods to meet need would be negative (constitute a 
threat) or positive.  
 
The following table is intended as purely illustrative of the proposition that it 
might be possible to discern some broadly coherent connections between 
judgements and attitudes, i.e. how judgements might engender certain attitudes. 
As ever, the social context will be critical in influencing the nature of any such 
connections.  
 
Table 3: Possible Relationship between Judgements and Attitudes in 
Western Culture 
Capacity Agency Threat Possible resulting attitudes? 
X X X Negative – condemnation, fear, anger, negotiation, 
avoidance, subversion 
X X 
− 
Positive – endorsement, encouragement  
X 
− 
X Ambiguous – depends on assessments as to why an 
individual has no agency, when it might be expected 
that they would if they have capacity, why they are a 
threat when they have no agency, whether the 
individual is to be held accountable for their lack of 
agency and negative behaviour, or whether it is 
attributable to personal or structural factors beyond 
their control   
X 
− − 
Positive – society needs to empower the individual by 
giving them/obliging them to assume agency, while 
directing them to employ it in directions conducive to 
socio-cultural objectives 
− 
X X Negative – condemnation, fear, anger, etc. 
− − 
X Ambiguous – unclear why a threat should remain if the 
individual has no agency, unless the threat takes the 
form of a drain on resources  
− 
X 
− 
Ambiguous – direction to prevent agency being used 
in a negative way 
− − − 
Indifference – pity, patronisation, protection 
 
X = is judged to have component to their identity 
− = is judged not to have this component to their identity 
 
LINKING ATTITUDE TO ACTION 
As with connections between judgements and attitudes, connections between 
attitudes and actions are never likely to be straightforward or very consistent. 
Attitudes are not always consciously held and the consequences of actions are 
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not always externally obvious – particularly where the result is exclusion. Even 
where attitudes are consciously discriminatory, the scope for expression may be 
constrained, e.g. by legislation. It is possible, however, to attempt to trace how 
action might logically emanate from attitude. Again, the power balance is likely 
to be significant. For example, a more powerful administrator confronted with a 
less powerful transactor, might be expected to act as follows: 
¾ Condemnation, fear, anger: The removal of the transactor’s agency, e.g. 
through imprisonment and authoritarian containment, or constructions of 
scarcity around basic needs in order to be able to impose behavioural 
currency requirements. 
¾ Indifference, pity, patronisation: Indifference can be expected to lead to 
particularly inaccurate assessments – de facto less attention will be paid 
to the transactor’s capacity and ability to assume agency. Results may 
include the consolidation of disempowerment, needs defined by 
professionals rather than transactors, consequently inappropriate services 
and inaccessible transactional infrastructure. In addition, in the context of 
low expectations, there may be a disproportionately positive response to 
achievements. 
¾ Empowerment: The encouragement of agency, usually in a particular 
direction, through directing or withholding resources or ‘opportunity’. 
¾ Endorsement: The encouragement of agency and capacity by rewarding 
with resources and opportunity. 
¾ Acceptance of the role of structural factors in inhibiting capacity and 
agency: Action in the form of special add-on programmes to redress 
historical imbalances in resources and opportunities. Adjustments to 
transactional infrastructure or entitlement criteria. 
 
The above responses, while they may seem broadly logical, are nonetheless 
speculative. The existence of interconnections between indicators, judgements, 
attitudes and actions might usefully be explored via qualitative research, bearing 
in mind that their nature can be expected to vary according to the social context. 
 
5. Construing Identity 
Whereas sometimes possessions, personal characteristics and behaviour will be 
apparent, this will not always be the case. To successfully transact, it is not just 
necessary to have currency, but to be able to demonstrate it, or the lack of it, 
depending on the terms of transaction. Strategies may also be found to conceal 
‘negative’ currency, where to have it is counter-productive to the allocation of 
goods. 
 
Even if the exact location cannot be fixed, it may be possible to discern 
parameters within which truth about identity must be located. Invariably, this 
must be set into context, a comparison with something else, the knowledge that 
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both alternatives cannot co-exist as they are mutually exclusive. It is suggested 
that there exists a series of naturally occurring limitations, which can be used as 
reliable indicators. This is where alternatives exist whose co-existence is 
conceptually and practically impossible. For example: 
 
Opportunity costs: 
¾ Time limitations – if time is devoted to one activity, the same time cannot 
be spent on another activity. 
¾ Resource limitations – if money is spent on one purchase, the same 
money cannot be spent on another.  
 
Space: 
¾ Geographical location – if a person is (physically) in one place the same 
person cannot simultaneously (physically) be somewhere else.  
¾ Land is a finite resource (Hirsch 1997) and there must be limitations on 
its usage. 
 
Quantity: If there is one full-time job, one house, one transaction to be framed, 
there are limitations to the numbers of people that can have or do them, 
notwithstanding that they may be widely or narrowly distributed, e.g. the job 
becomes part-time and shared, the house becomes multiply occupied and the 
transaction is framed according to pluralist rather than elitist principles.  
 
Biological characteristics? These may be mutually exclusive – e.g., a person 
cannot be old and young, disabled and non-disabled, black and white, at the 
same time providing meanings and context are held constant. 
 
Currency will be made identifiable to assessors in various ways, some more 
reliable or less ambiguous than others. Appearance may – or may not – give 
clues to personal characteristics (e.g. skin tone, age, some forms of impairment). 
Accent too, may serve as a complementary indicator, reinforcing or diminishing 
the messages conveyed by appearance. The use of jargon acts as a status symbol 
and mechanism for identifying shared characteristics (specialisms) and 
delineating roles. These indicators may also be taken as a means of predicting 
behaviour. However, to make sound judgements, each needs to be able to assess 
the other’s behaviour through experiencing it over time. Clearly, this may not 
always be practical. So, written documentation, references or testimonials may 
be required. Evidence of the consequences of action, or inaction, will often be 
difficult to establish, when effects may be due to one of many causes, not least 
structural barriers or personal failings. Of all currencies, behaviour will often be 
the most difficult to assess. It is generally easier to portray material resources in 
reliable form. It is straightforward to assess amounts of cash – there is either 
enough presented to make the purchase or there is not.  
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Evidence of one type of currency may be taken to indicate the likely presence or 
absence of others. Although Gershuny states: “We are what we have done; what 
we are determines what we do next; what we do next determines what we 
become.” (1998, pp36,37), the relationship between possession of material 
resources and personal characteristics and what we are is, if anything, more 
blurred. The possession of income/wealth or societally or culturally valued 
goods can define identity and enhance personal value. Similarly lack of these 
may define identity and decrease ascribed personal value. Material possessions 
may mitigate ‘negative’ personal characteristics or emphasise them. 
Assumptions about personal characteristics might be made on the basis of the 
possession of income etc, or lack of it – taken as a proxy-indicators of good/bad 
character, un/importance, etc. Similarly, personal characteristics, such as age, 
minority ethnic status, non/disability might be taken as proxy-indicators of 
income (or lack of it), etc. However, whatever the probabilities, assumptions 
and proxy-indicators may well be totally inaccurate. Personal characteristics as 
well as their significance may both be determined by the social context and its 
terms of inclusion.  
 
As discussed above, individuals each possess a number of characteristics, 
although one may predominate, depending on the socio-cultural context, 
exposed nature of the characteristic, objectives and currency for assessment and 
attitudes of the assessor. Characteristics may be linked, or be stereotypically 
perceived to be linked, e.g. disability and ill-health; homosexuality and HIV 
positive status; possession of qualifications and high income; lack of 
qualifications and ethnic minority origin. Indeed, there may be quantitative 
research evidence to support the probability of such connections. It does not 
follow that this can be relied upon in every case.  
 
The practical difficulties of making precise assessments may be a factor in the 
establishment of broad classes or bands of people, based around more clearly 
identifiable characteristics, at the expense of others that are less readily 
discernible. The narrower the band, the more exclusionary or exclusive. The 
wider the band, the greater the likelihood that other relevant resources or 
characteristics will be overlooked. The more indicators or criteria employed in 
assessment, the more accurate and less stereotypical that assessment is likely to 
be. Yet such an approach may also be unacceptably intrusive, while narrowing 
down the gateway to inclusion.  
 
6. Discrimination  
It is proposed that discrimination can broadly be defined as ‘failure to enable, 
recognise, or act consistently upon, the presentation of required currencies’. 
Generally this translates as ‘unjustifiably unfavourable treatment’. The chief 
reason why it is unjustifiable is likely to be because it is inequitable. 
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Judgements hinge on assessments of sameness and difference. Treatment 
becomes inequitable when those with the same characteristics are treated 
differently, or those with different characteristics are treated the same. However, 
it is possible for people with certain characteristics (age, gender, ethnic origin, 
physical impairment, etc.) to be unjustly but consistently treated unfavourably 
because of that characteristic.  
 
If we take transactional processes (see Section One) as mechanisms for 
inclusion, it should become possible to explore the potential role played by 
discrimination in promoting exclusion. There appears to be potential for it to 
intervene in different ways and at different stages of the transactional process: 
¾ Framing of transactional processes may exclude people with relevant 
types or amounts of currencies, either invalidating them as prospective 
transactors from the outset, or rejecting them at the point of assessment 
¾ Reliance on irrelevant or inaccurate indicators, and failure to identify 
significant characteristics and resources 
¾ The creation of ‘broad classes of people’ to whom social rights are 
accorded, where each class shares one or some characteristics but where 
individuals may possess others that are relevant 
¾ Administrative procedures lacking transparency, discretionary 
judgements and lack of accountability for inequitable treatment 
¾ Inaccessible transactional infrastructures 
 
The misconstrual of identity, either by framers or by administrators, may be one 
cause of inequitable treatment. Yet it would also be possible for identity to be 
accurately construed, but for inequitable distribution still to occur.  
 
DISCRIMINATION AS MISCONSTRUAL OF IDENTITY 
It is clear from the above discussion that the accurate construal of identity is 
fraught with difficulties. Yet, for people with certain characteristics, the 
misconstrual and ascription of their identity, the attitudes that provoke it and the 
negative responses that ensue can be everyday occurrences. Even where certain 
characteristics are not judged to be relevant, there may be a lack of awareness as 
to how people with them are effectively barred from participating because of the 
way transactions are framed and infrastructure is constructed. For example, an 
ability to speak fluent English, or to climb stairs may not be relevant to the 
transaction, and these may not be selected by framers as relevant criteria for the 
transaction. Nonetheless, inaccessible transactional infrastructure may make it 
impossible for people without those abilities to claim a benefit or make a 
purchase. The selection of valid currencies and their indicators, and the extent to 
which currencies define identity, is clearly critical when it comes to framing and 
administering transactional processes. So too is awareness of how those with 
valid currencies may nonetheless be excluded. It is not just a matter of 
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accurately construing identity but of fully comprehending the implications of 
certain otherwise irrelevant characteristics and, where possible, taking measures 
to accommodate them so that they do not impede participation. 
 
DISCRIMINATION AS INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
Inequitable or discriminatory allocation may theoretically arise even where 
construal of identity at the points of framing and assessment is accurate. Despite 
possessing relevant currencies and successfully conveying them, allocation is 
withheld. This may be because administrators choose to discount the fact that 
currency conditions are met, perhaps because they attribute significance to 
another characteristic. Discrimination is deliberate, for example where racists 
believe that people from other ethnic groups are intrinsically inferior or lacking 
in desert, or women are not promoted, not because they are less competent than 
men, but because of their gender. Particular currencies (here, personal 
characteristics) or aspects of identity are accorded over-riding significance by 
some administrators, even where framers have decreed these to be irrelevant. 
Where criteria are not explicit and administrative procedures are not open and 
transparent, the scope for discriminatory and inequitable actions by those 
responsible for allocation increases. 
 
DISCRIMINATION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT 
As discussed, the social context is the means through which identity is 
understood. However, it may not be simply that norms determine how people 
with certain characteristics are treated, and they in turn understand their own 
identities. It may be that the nature of the social context creates characteristics, 
either accentuating or minimising differences between people and how they 
must be treated if they are to be accommodated. Where the mainstream is 
narrow, a variety of additional measures will be required – in themselves 
underlining that those in receipt of them are ‘different’ to the norm. In as much 
as social context finds expression through transactional processes, a ‘narrow 
mainstream’ might be illustrated by the creation of inaccessible transactional 
infrastructure. The implicit requirement that people should be able to climb 
stairs might be addressed, either by installing a ramp or a lift which everyone 
would use, thereby widening the mainstream and minimising difference. 
Alternatively, a chair-lift just for people who cannot climb stairs might be 
installed – leaving the mainstream unchanged and accentuating difference. 
While the barrier to equal participation may have been overcome, the means of 
doing so remains inequitable. If both solutions are possible, but one means is 
preferable to another, and those having to use the less preferable means are 
consequently disadvantaged, then it also becomes discriminatory.  
 
Discrimination may also arise in situations where discrepancies exist between 
social contexts and transactional criteria. Either the same criteria in different 
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social contexts, or different criteria in the same social context, might give rise to 
unjustifiable inequities.  
    
 
It seems possible to summarise the key ways in which discrimination might be 
expressed as follows: 
¾ A reaction to certain characteristics, whether perceived or actual, and 
associated value judgements 
¾ A failure to accommodate certain characteristics because the need to do 
so is not recognised 
¾ The accentuation, designation or creation of certain characteristics due to 
the construction (purposeful or otherwise) of social and transactional 
context 
 
A discriminatory reaction might be: 
¾ To prevent an individual or community with certain characteristics from 
participating in a given transactional process 
¾ To acknowledge only the one characteristic, when many characteristics 
may exist 
¾ On the basis of that one characteristic, to impose an identity and its label 
on the individual or community, preventing self-definition 
¾ To make assumptions about individual capacity and behaviour based on a 
cultural and/or transactional blueprint or stereotype 
¾ To fail to acknowledge differences beyond the collective stereotype, 
despite evidence to the contrary - assuming structures and attitudes permit 
contradictory evidence to emerge and that judgements of incapacity do 
not become self-fulfilling, either because development of capacity 
requires access, e.g. to education, and this is denied, or because the 
individual, being part of that culture or society believes the message that 
they have no capacity or agency 
 
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
As previously discussed, discrimination may originate in attitudes and/or find 
expression via action or behaviour. There are, however, a range of forms that 
discrimination might take:  
  
Attitudinal: based on perceived or actual personal or cultural characteristics: 
¾ One characteristic negates others 
¾ Conflation of individual with collective (stereotype), assumption of 
personal capacity/possession of material resources/behaviour derived 
from collective characteristic 
¾ Consciously, or unconsciously, assessment only focuses on narrowly 
defined norms 
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Behavioural: expressed in the design of transactional infrastructure 
(environment and organisational processes), or the behaviour of one individual 
towards another, perhaps reflecting attitudes.  
 
Deliberate: inaccurate stereotypes are socio-culturally legitimised, or 
legitimised within that counter-culture. 
 
Non-deliberate: attitudes and behaviour are not conscious and there is no 
awareness of misconstrual. 
 
Direct: there is a strong and transparent causal relationship between the attitude 
or behaviour (whether deliberate or not) and its discriminatory impact. 
 
Indirect: there is a weaker and more complex causal relationship. 
 
Clearly, differing combinations of the above can co-exist, while some forms are 
more likely to be mutually exclusive. As discussed, there may be some 
discernible consistency between attitudes and behaviour. It is harder to see how 
discrimination might be both deliberate and non-deliberate, although a decision 
might be informed by elements of both. Non-deliberate and indirect 
discrimination might be more likely to go together, simply because the latter’s 
complexities make it less obvious and awareness might therefore be more 
limited. Indirect and direct discrimination seem mutually incompatible, 
although there may be a range of indirect consequences of direct discrimination. 
These categories, separately and in combination, constitute a basis for 
developing a typology of forms of discrimination. The typology should also 
acknowledge the possibility of positive discrimination where people receive 
favourable treatment on the basis of a given characteristic or class, even if the 
usually required currencies are not possessed. 
 
Discrimination, as classified above, might permeate different societal levels, it 
might be part of the culture of institutions at any level or be perpetrated by 
individuals for personal reasons. Arguably, discrimination could also take micro 
or macro forms. For example, a wheel-chair user’s mobility may be restricted 
because someone has placed their car keys out of reach on a high shelf (micro 
level), or because vehicles in national transport systems are inaccessible (macro 
level).  
 
It is worth noting that, not only can the perpetrators of discrimination emanate 
from different sources and levels, it can similarly be experienced by different 
subjects or targets. Transactors may be the recipients or the perpetrators of 
discrimination, e.g. making judgements about administrators, framers and goods 
on the basis of inadequate information and stereotypes. While usually this will 
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be individuals or classes/communities based on shared personal characteristics, 
these may include geographical location. Whole areas or neighbourhoods may 
find themselves subject to discrimination in the allocation of resources, high 
house or car insurance premiums, etc. There may be discrimination against 
institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals deemed to be of poor quality). The causes 
and expressions may be much the same – either deliberate or not deliberate, 
with the latter based on inadequate indicators and misconstrual. 
 
OUTCOMES 
The outcomes of different forms of discrimination, i.e. the nature of resulting 
exclusionary barriers, can similarly take different forms, which may be inter-
connected. Again, separately and in combination the following categories form 
a basis for a typology of discriminatory outcomes. Categories and their 
interconnections include: 
  
Space/Environmental barriers: These may take a physical form, e.g. 
inaccessible premises, transport, etc. However, barriers may also emanate from 
discriminatory behaviour, e.g. no safe play areas for children, no-go areas for 
women or elderly people, or for people from different ethnic origins or religious 
backgrounds, because of the risk of crime or violence. Whole neighbourhoods 
may find themselves discriminated against. Barriers may also be financial, 
where payment for entry is required, or where house prices are high. Subsequent 
behaviour, and behavioural currency, may depend on having had access to 
certain environments, e.g. schools. The ability to transact can be impeded by 
spatial barriers in a variety of ways. This will determine the extent of mobility. 
 
Communication barriers: Communication may be in a language not understood, 
or poorly understood, by the potential transactor because it is not in their first 
language. In written form, it may exclude people with visual impairments, while 
in oral form it may exclude people with hearing impairments. The use of jargon 
may inhibit understanding, deliberately or otherwise. Accent may give rise to 
discriminatory behaviour, on the basis of assumed class, educational 
background or ethnicity. Information may only be available at certain places, or 
at certain times, or via certain media, e.g. radio, internet, informal networks. 
Access to information may depend on resource levels, i.e. it may be necessary 
to pay for some forms of advice. Subsequent behaviour, and behavioural 
currency, may depend on having had access to information. 
 
Financial/resource barriers: Currency requirements may exclude physically, or 
in terms of access to information about transactions, or from actually 
transacting. In as much as it is often necessary to have resources in order to 
obtain more, financial poverty, or advantage, is likely to be cumulative. The 
treatment of people with differing levels of resources may be purposefully 
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inequitable, whether to equalise resource levels, or exacerbate differences. A 
very particular form of financial barrier can occur at the point where 
transactions based on lack of currency cease and transactions based on having 
currency commence, i.e. the poverty traps caused by means testing. Poverty 
may well be an outcome of discrimination, disproportionately affecting classes 
of people with certain characteristics (it cannot, though, be assumed that all 
people within those classes will be poor). Subsequent behaviour, and 
behavioural currency, may depend on having had prior access to financial 
resources. 
 
Timing/organisational barriers: The way in which transactions are organised, 
their assessments and delivery mechanisms can act as a barrier to transaction. 
People with some forms of impairment may need more time to perform certain 
tasks or to communicate (e.g. have documents translated into Braille or recorded 
onto tape). Some places where transactions occur may only be open at certain 
times. Yet people may have limited stamina, or only be able to attend 
appointments or go shopping at certain times, perhaps reflecting inflexibilities 
in personal assistance arrangements. Inflexibilities in working hours may also 
adversely affect people with child-care responsibilities. Again, subsequent 
behaviour, and behavioural currency, may depend on the existence or removal 
of organisational barriers.  
 
Behavioural/personal history barriers: Evidence of behaviour is a key currency, 
and, as Gershuny (1998) argues, is a major definer of past and probable future 
identity. Yet it is clear that behaviour, and by implication identity, may well not 
be autonomously determined, but can be constrained by a variety of barriers. 
Agency is limited, not necessarily because of limits to personal capacity 
including potential, or because of individual choice, but because of a variety of 
barriers resulting from discrimination of one sort or another. Assumptions of 
lack of agency can become self-fulfilling. 
 
JUSTIFIABLY UNFAVOURABLE TREATMENT 
It is notable that many of these barriers emanate from transactional 
infrastructure. Many barriers are theoretically removable, in that they are 
features of the socio-cultural context and there may be choices to be made about 
the terms of inclusion. However, it does not follow that it will necessarily be 
feasible, theoretically or practically, to remove all barriers for all people on all 
occasions. For example, there may be immutable features to a given job which 
require it to be done at certain times. Some will require physical strength, 
particular abilities, language and communication skills and these may not 
always be obtainable through ‘adjustments’ to individuals. Sometimes flexibility 
for one worker may create inflexibilities for others. But the significance of non-
negotiable features in the social landscape will be lessened the more objectives 
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it accommodates (e.g. giving an equal weight to paid work and child-rearing), 
and the more currencies and goods are valued. 
 
Notwithstanding that some barriers must remain, where immutable features of 
the socio-cultural context intersect with immutable personal characteristics, 
there will be occasions where ‘unfavourable’ treatment is warranted. To avoid 
falling into the trap of complacency, of conforming without challenge to the 
values of the liberal establishment (Gouldner, 1975), it cannot be assumed that 
all unfavourable treatment is unjustifiable. We cannot assume that all have equal 
capacity, or an absence of agency on the part of the ‘discriminated against’ 
individual – to do so would be to stereotype/discriminate unjustifiably. We need 
to take seriously the possibility that judgements on individual or collective 
incapacity can be accurate.  
 
It is possible that incapacity may be correctly associated with a given 
characteristic. Individuals with that characteristic may not have a capacity that 
is equal to that of others who do not share it. Sometimes individuals may have 
choices and knowingly adopt a course of action which contravenes normative 
morals or legislation. They may simply make a poor choice. Societies too need 
to make choices about where to direct resources. Although there may be scope 
to expand options for inclusion, as discussed in section 2, some options will be 
mutually exclusive. Neither does it follow that everyone must or can be enabled 
to do everything if they are to be included. This is not an argument in favour of 
abandoning priorities or assessment criteria altogether. People must, however, 
be facilitated to participate in valued transactions, if the goal is inclusion. The 
more forms of these there are, the greater the chance of people with different 
resources and characteristics being included.  
 
While it cannot be assumed that what is deemed to be normative should not be 
subject to challenge, some forms of behaviour will clearly be directly or 
indirectly detrimental to others. As such, unfavourable treatment of the 
perpetrators of such behaviour would logically be justifiable. Where 
unfavourable treatment is justifiable, it follows that it must be consistent – or 
once again it ceases to be justifiable.  
 
By the same token, unfavourable treatment of the perpetrators, deliberate or 
otherwise, of discrimination must be justified, in that they are consequently the 
perpetrators of detrimental behaviour. As Plant has argued in another context, 
moral responsibility should be taken “not just in relation to the intended 
consequences but also the foreseeable consequences.” (1992, p24). Of course, 
those that do not bother to look, or to obtain the necessary feedback from those 
potentially adversely affected, are unlikely to foresee consequences – implying 
a further extension of moral responsibility.  
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7. Scope for Discrimination in Different Types of Transaction 
THE ROLE OF RIGHTS 
It is suggested that there are two main forms of transaction, namely those which 
are based on social rights and those on purchase in the market. However, rights 
play a key role in framing both sorts of transaction. Much of the approach 
described in this paper finds echoes in the literature on rights and their roles (see 
for example Marshall 1950, Bellamy 1993, Plant 1992, Nozick 1974, Dworkin 
1984). While it is not relevant to review this in detail here, neither is there space 
to do so, some of the debates and concepts discussed in the literature are 
particularly pertinent. 
 
It is presupposed that different types of rights exist, notionally, to perform 
certain functions. Rights, whether morally or legally based, can be construed as 
tools for rendering visible societal norms, to the degree that society tolerates 
individuals acting independently from it or in opposition to it, i.e. the space 
available for individuals to exercise agency in contravention of those norms. 
They can be devices for making explicit resource adjustments in order to 
achieve greater balance, or imbalance, between individuals in terms of 
participation or ownership of different types of scarce resources. They thus play 
an important role in making explicit the terms of inclusion, and in constructing 
the various roles in transactional processes.  
 
Rights are the means by which transactions are framed, in accordance with the 
dominant objectives and norms (Dworkin 1984). As previously discussed, 
transactions can be framed at different levels. Rights, therefore, can emanate 
from different societal levels, from the European Union and United Nations, e.g. 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Bellamy 1993), European 
measures on anti-discrimination. Such rights in turn set the parameters within 
which lower societal level rights must be framed.  
 
Marshall (1950) identified three types of rights, namely civil, political and 
social, describing these as the ‘three legged stool of citizenship’. This signals 
that rights may be associated with different spheres. Others have distinguished 
between negative rights or immunities and positive rights and freedoms (Berlin 
1958). Essentially, a negative view of liberty (freedom from) and associated 
rights hinges on: “the absence of intentional interference by others” (Bellamy 
1993, p49), including the right to life, security of property, freedom of speech 
and belief, and to engage in economic activity without State interference. In 
(supposed) contrast, positive rights (freedom to) in the form of social or welfare 
rights, necessitate both action and cost (Plant 1992). Yet, negative ‘civil’ rights 
too require action (and cost) (Plant 1992), if potential transactors are not to be 
barred from transaction by inaccessible infrastructure, or have their capacity and 
agency negated via currencies which invalidate them from citizenship rights. 
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Such rights determine who can, and who cannot, have access to transactional 
processes, and also whether or not individuals have choice about engaging with 
them.  
 
Thus, while rights may act as currency through which to acquire resources, to 
have rights in the first place requires successful transaction subject to the 
presentation of designated currency. Appropriate subjects for rights are usually 
defined in terms of ‘rational autonomous agents’. Yet to be such may hinge on 
having rights, and thus it should not be a pre-condition for rights. In the past, 
while there was recognition that some, e.g. the “disabled and feeble-minded” 
would be unable to achieve even “minimum status through the market” (Plant 
1992, p15), the remedy was seen as either charity or (work-based) Poor Law 
provision, and this was not construed in terms of rights (Marshall 1950). 
Marshall singles out elderly people and ‘the handicapped’ as examples of where 
“the principle of universality which is a characteristic feature of the modern 
rights of citizenship does not apply” (1950, p92), society – or rather a society 
which prioritises the objective of wealth generation - having no need of their 
health, education or happiness. Services are rendered out of compassion, not 
rights, while “the handicapped have a moral duty to try to overcome their 
misfortunes as far as within them lies.”  
 
This does not merely reinforce exclusion, such discriminatory attitudes create 
structural barriers, while casting moral responsibility back onto those excluded. 
The assumption that disabled people have nothing to offer society becomes self-
fulfilling as society imposes ‘structural’ incapacities upon them. This in turn 
compels them to rely on ‘compassion’ - or these days necessitates dependence 
on welfare rights. The failure to enforce civil rights brings dependency on social 
rights. Yet the structure and delivery of social rights can further erode civil 
rights. 
 
Although it is convenient, and to some extent conceptually coherent, to portray 
rights as currency which can be exchanged for public resources, their role is 
primarily one of shaping the nature of transactional processes. This is true in 
both public and private sectors, where citizenship and consumer rights apply 
respectively. Regarding access to public resources, rights can specify what is to 
be, and cannot be, treated as ‘valid’ currency, define the product to which they 
bring entitlement and permit legal redress.  
 
While rights can promote a standardised, equitable approach to transactions 
where transactors can demonstrate designated characteristics, levels of material 
resources and/or behaviours, access to rights can also reflect and reinforce 
discriminatory attitudes, thereby exacerbating exclusion. While rights apply to 
public and private sector transactions, how they operate in assessments for each 
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varies considerably. This is to be expected, given the different types of 
transaction and assessment criteria which occur in each. Despite standardising 
approaches, the fact that different assessments rely on different currencies and 
indicators of varying reliability means that the scope for misconstrual of identity 
similarly varies.  
 
Crossing all areas of public policy, and also regulating the actions of the private 
sector, is anti-discrimination legislation. This bestows (some) rights to equal 
treatment on (some) designated minority groups. Rights also can have an impact 
on transactional infrastructure in any sector, e.g. the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 specifies that ‘reasonable adjustments’ to premises must be made. This 
area of policy too will be founded on constructions of identity, will express 
certain attitudes and draw a line between those who are covered and those who 
are not. Furthermore, to challenge discrimination it is first necessary to 
demonstrate that it has occurred. Familiar difficulties arise when it comes to 
finding reliable indicators of behaviour. For example, it is hard to challenge 
discrimination at the point of recruitment – not least because there may well be 
no independent witnesses, and equal opportunities procedures require that no 
information about other candidates be divulged.   
 
Rights therefore have their limitations. However, none of this is to argue that 
rights are unimportant. Instead, they are a critical expression of the terms of 
inclusion. While some rights, typically emanating from international 
institutions, tend to be of the ‘universal’ or ‘human’ kind, and may be 
considered a priori to lower level socio-cultural structuring, the way rights are 
allocated will often reflect and reinforce dominant socio-cultural objectives, 
limiting or steering agency accordingly. Yet, while rights can enshrine and 
perpetuate discrimination, they can also be the means of challenging it. 
 
SCOPE FOR DISCRIMINATION IN SOCIAL RIGHTS-BASED TRANSACTIONS 
With regard to social security, certain parameters are set by European 
legislation, e.g. rights to equal treatment irrespective of gender. Generally, social 
security assessments aim to assess degrees and types of incapacity, resource 
levels, whether agency could and should be assumed and how disadvantage 
arose. There will be access restrictions based on nationality and place of 
residence. The concern is to establish need, risk of need and desert. Entitlement 
draws on a vast range of indicators of personal characteristics, possession of 
material resources and behaviour. ‘Right’ means that access to benefit is 
achieved once possession of the required currency has been demonstrated, that 
assessments should not depend on the discretionary judgements of assessors and 
that negative outcomes can be legally challenged. Assessment takes the form of 
adjudication, and reviews and appeals procedures exist to promote equitable 
treatment. In keeping with the Government’s objective of promoting ‘welfare to 
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work’, and fears about so-called welfare dependency, it is noticeable that 
behavioural, i.e. job-seeking, currency is assuming greater importance in 
assessments. This could be translated as ‘no public resources without 
demonstration of an attempt to assume agency and build capacity’. Whether this 
is required because there is a serious expectation that it will lead to 
employment, or because it demonstrates adherence to approved socio-cultural 
objectives and norms, is a moot point. The underlying assumption appears to be 
that unemployment is attributable to individual rather than structural failings 
and is thus primarily to be addressed through ‘adjustments’ to individuals. Of 
course, structural adjustments may fall within the purview of other policy areas, 
such as anti-discrimination legislation. 
 
Social security is a rights-based system, and thus strives to be standardised and 
equitable in terms of assessment processes. However, entitlements are based on 
a variety of criteria and outcomes for people with the same needs can be far 
from equitable. The gap in benefit income of two people who are equally and 
extremely disabled can be as much as £337.30 a week, only reduced to £250.60 
through including possible entitlement to means-tested income support 
(Disability Rights Handbook 2001/02). The complexity of the system is also a 
serious deterrent, necessitating access to expert advice and information.  
 
Judgements on entitlement to National Health Service health care may be based 
on need, budgetary constraints and the supposed degree of gain that the 
treatment would bring to an individual. Agency is often not taken as a relevant 
factor – i.e. whether the individual is responsible for their medical condition e.g. 
causing the accident which resulted in a broken leg. Agency may rather be 
ceded to the medical profession, on whose specialist judgements the 
patient/transactor becomes obliged to depend. The power relationship is 
reinforced by the extensive use of jargon and weak accountability mechanisms; 
doctors being primarily accountable to other doctors. Thus the NHS does not 
enshrine rights to health-care as such. ‘Right’ in this context means the right to 
have one’s medical condition assessed by a physician. The individual has no 
rights to a given treatment, or over where, when or even if treatment will occur. 
This may further depend on where the individual happens to live, in what has 
been termed a ‘post-code lottery’. The basis for decision on what treatment an 
individual gets is unlikely to be transparent or standardised. The whole shape of 
the transaction is blurred. 
 
Access to public-sector housing depends on personal characteristics and agency, 
i.e. whether or not a person is deemed ‘vulnerable’ or ‘intentionally homeless’. 
Access to public-sector education hinges on capacity and, increasingly, on 
income. Unlike social security, resources often follow capacity rather than 
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incapacity, although recent legislation (the SEN and Disability Act 2000) may 
go some way to redressing this.  
 
Thus, within the social rights field, there are a vast number of inconsistencies. 
In some cases assessment of agency is critical, in others fairly irrelevant. In 
some cases resources are obtained on the basis of ‘negative’ currencies, like low 
income or impairment, while in others they rely on positive demonstrations of 
ability. Multiple indicators are used and a variety of opposing conclusions are 
drawn. Even where transactions are clearly rights-based, outcomes can be very 
inequitable. Meanwhile, in a medical context, discretionary judgements 
masquerade as rights and may be very inequitable, even if less easily discernible 
to the outsider.  
 
SCOPE FOR DISCRIMINATION IN FREE MARKET/PRIVATE SECTOR TRANSACTIONS 
Free market transactions similarly take different forms. Different currencies will 
be relevant and scope for discrimination will consequently vary. Money is the 
usual currency, although other forms of material resource could in theory be 
exchanged. While levels of material resources play differing roles alongside 
personal characteristics and behaviour in transactional processes for public 
resources, they generally over-ride these when it comes to such private sector 
transactions. The latter are considerably less ‘fuzzy’, discretionary and generally 
(but not always) less complex. Access criteria are clearly spelt out via price and 
the decision-making process is simple and may not really exist at all. The 
vendor (administrator) does not have to weigh up which of the many customers 
with the necessary resources can purchase the last Mars Bar.  
 
Consumer rights should ensure that the good to be purchased must be accurately 
defined, safe and of a satisfactory standard. However, in some situations 
accurate description of the good is problematic. Where the good purchased is 
behavioural, e.g. provision of a service, or where it relates to complex products 
such as private pensions, education or health-care, there are difficulties in 
establishing and conveying meaningful product descriptions (Barr 2001). 
Access to high quality advice may be critical. Again difficulties arise for the 
consumer who may not be able to afford it, understand it or judge its quality.  
 
It may become more likely that discrimination will be perpetuated by 
consumers/transactors rather than administrators or framers. They may reject a 
product on criteria that have no necessary bearing on its quality or ability to 
meet their needs. Decisions may be made (consciously or otherwise) on the 
basis of locations, e.g. poor services will exist in poor areas, or personal 
characteristics, e.g. that an Asian doctor, or a shop assistant who uses a wheel-
chair, would provide an inferior service.  
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Generally, there is one indicator – possession of the requisite cash – and the 
good is allocated to whoever is first in the queue. In the event of a national 
dearth of Mars Bars, prices may go up, thereby excluding transactors with less 
cash, but the principle remains the same. Alternatively, production of Mars Bars 
may be increased – although an increase in production in some cases, such as 
land, may not be an option. Amounts of money are less prone to inaccurate 
assessment than other forms of currency. Where discrimination does occur, i.e. 
irrelevant currencies such as ethnic origin are taken into account, it seems more 
likely to be of the deliberate, direct kind and consequently easier to spot. Rarely 
are personal characteristics relevant, excepting when it comes to the purchase of 
goods such as alcohol or tobacco, where age is taken as indicative of capacity to 
assume agency, and in private insurance, where a range of characteristics and 
resources will be assessed in order to identify risk. In contrast to social security, 
with private insurance the greater the risk the less likely that coverage will be 
provided and the more expensive it is likely to be. Under the Assisted 
Placements Scheme, private schooling could be accessed by pupils judged to 
have capacity (potential), even in the absence of material resources. 
 
When it comes to acquiring money via employment, the currency is primarily 
likely to be one of behaviour, i.e. past employment or educational history as 
testimony to capacity. Depending on the job, personal characteristics (e.g. 
physical strength, communication skills) will be more or less relevant. The way 
in which the job is framed may be discriminatory, in that requirements are 
stipulated which are not relevant. At the point of assessment, i.e. recruitment, 
there exists the potential for a variety of irrelevant indicators to be taken into 
account, and misconstrual of identity to occur. There may also be inequitable 
access to employment opportunities, perhaps due to inaccessible transactional 
infrastructure, or past discrimination in education. Anti-discrimination 
legislation is intended to prevent irrelevant factors from being included in 
assessments, although it may sometimes be hard to demonstrate this.  
 
8. The Role Of Discrimination in Promoting Exclusion 
Discrimination is often rooted in a misconstrual or distortion of identity 
(contrary to what the word discrimination implies, a failure to discriminate or 
observe accurately). On the one hand it emphasises difference between 
individuals and the wider community, on the other it denies differences between 
individuals or communities who happen to share one or more characteristics. 
Through focusing on difference, it results in failure (or refusal) to acknowledge 
similarities between the individual/community with that characteristic and the 
wider community. 
 
The shape of discrimination is likely primarily to be socio-culturally 
determined, but may be expressed at different levels. It originates in a mismatch 
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of socio-culture context, related blueprints depicting approaches to personal 
characteristics and roles based on personal characteristics, what that culture 
de/values, what it recognises as capacity, what it deems to be ‘goods’, and how 
it structures transactional processes and infrastructure. The requirements of 
assessment procedures and the reliability of indicators (intrinsic or otherwise) 
will also be major factors. 
 
Discrimination can take a variety of forms and result in a range of exclusionary 
barriers. It can intervene at different stages of the transactional process and be 
experienced by any party. Indeed, discrimination against administrators or 
framers with certain discernible personal characteristics may prevent people 
with those characteristics from acquiring such roles, thereby adding to their 
disempowerment.  
 
Rights perform various functions with regard to transactional processes. They 
are not intrinsically anti-discriminatory but, instead, reflect the desired terms of 
inclusion of a given society. They can, therefore, either perpetuate 
discrimination, or act as a means of preventing or challenging it. Yet, in the 
latter case, difficulties can arise in that it becomes necessary to demonstrate that 
discrimination has occurred. Once again, the intrinsic inadequacy of indicators, 
particularly with regard to behaviour, may make this problematic. 
 
Overall, therefore, discrimination in its various guises would seem to have the 
potential to be a major cause of exclusion. Sometimes it will be deliberate, often 
it will arise from lack of awareness, and unconscious assumptions based on 
socio-culturally derived norms. Sometimes it may be possible to reframe 
transactions, so that more reliable indicators are selected. Yet, clearly this is 
impossible while lack of awareness remains. There may be occasions when it is 
impossible to make judgements on the basis of reliable indicators. Nonetheless, 
a great deal could be done to raise awareness as to when erroneous assumptions 
are being made, so that they can be challenged. Unfavourable treatment may be 
justifiable – but it does need to be justified.   
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Conclusion: Including Diversity 
This paper has sought to conceptualise how societies are structured and operate, 
and the consequent implications for the inclusion or exclusion of people with 
certain characteristics, types and levels of resources. It has only been possible 
here to outline the main features of a possible model and the main strands of 
associated argument. There are certainly other issues signposted. Having 
pursued them further, we may gain a new perspective on our starting point and 
need to re-plot its dimensions and location.  
 
The approach taken challenges, incorporates or repackages many of the themes 
and explanations about social exclusion to be found in the literature. In 
particular, it has been concerned to bring discrimination into the equation, 
exploring how resources not only need to be held, but also need to be 
acknowledged, if inclusion is to be achieved. How resources are communicated, 
and the sometimes precarious relationship between tangibility and symbolism, 
thus becomes of critical importance. Ultimately, both the terms for inclusion and 
the indicators deemed to demonstrate compliance with them will be determined 
by dominant socio-cultural objectives and norms.   
 
While it is probable that poverty, inequality and unemployment will be factors 
in generating exclusion in many societies, this is likely to be particularly so in 
those where free market economic objectives dominate. Yet, as discussed, 
having material resources, i.e. not being in poverty, is no guarantee of inclusion 
– not just because discriminatory assumptions may obscure the view (e.g. that a 
person with an obvious physical impairment/darker skin tone, etc will be poor), 
but because transactional infrastructure is inaccessible. In some societies, 
material possessions may have less importance as indicators of identity and 
status, both of which may be key to successful transaction at a symbolic rather 
than tangible level. This may be particularly necessary for social transactions, 
based on identification of shared characteristics and peer groups.  
 
The relationship between inequality and exclusion is exceptionally complex and 
can vary depending on how widely or narrowly the terms of inclusion are 
drafted. If no one sphere dominates another, and different transactions, goods 
and currencies are equally valued, many forms of, or routes to, inclusion 
become possible. A lack of one type of resource therefore does not necessarily 
result in exclusion. Similarly, neither do inequalities with regard to that one type 
of resource result in exclusion. Positional goods of power, prestige and 
influence may exist independently in each sphere, and at different societal 
levels, and may be held by different individuals to an equal extent. This further 
suggests that it is possible to increase the prevalence of positional goods 
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through stratification between spheres and societal levels. The implication is 
that an individual may have power and prestige in one sphere, or at one level, 
but not necessarily in others. The same amount of power could (theoretically) 
exist in different non-overlapping spectrums, e.g. among directors of similar 
organisations. Each individual could have the same amount of power, specialist 
skills or knowledge, each within a different context or community. 
 
Furthermore, in a structure in which different objectives are valued, there is less 
likely to be one dominant good (Walzer 1983). Competition is subsequently 
diffused as individuals pursue different goals and associated goods, bringing 
different but theoretically equal status. This begins to signal how equality and 
diversity can logically co-exist, i.e. individuals may have equal power, status, 
resources, etc but in different areas and of different types. However, within this 
basic framework, further measures would be required to promote social 
mobility and choice, and to prevent the development of ‘parallel lives’.  
 
In a society where one dominant sphere gives access to others and where one 
level and set of socio-cultural objectives and norms predominates to the 
exclusion of others, power and resources will reside with just the one set of 
individuals. The management of scarcity creates competition in an environment 
where, even if many alternative goods exist, few are valued. For example, in 
capitalist societies, the incentive is to acquire the newest or the most expensive 
good, located in the ‘right’ area. Material possessions are taken as eloquent 
indicators of identity and status. Those only able to acquire lesser material 
possessions will consequently be deemed to have lesser status. The goods may 
be diverse, the qualities that imbue value are not. The prevailing dynamic is one 
of greater inequality and this will be compounded the more access to a range of 
transactional processes is dependent on accessing the one type of resource, and 
the more having that resource gives power over framing. In such societies, 
degrees of inequalities with regard to that type of resource can be taken as 
indicative of degrees of exclusion. Arguments for redistribution of that resource 
are consequently strengthened - if the goal is to promote inclusion.  
 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that whatever its flaws, the latter narrow rather 
one-dimensional society will have focus and cohesion, while the multi-faceted, 
multi-layered, complex alternative will be prone to fragmentation and 
instability. Alternatively, it could be argued that a narrow one-dimensional 
socio-cultural edifice is ill-equipped to withstand, adapt and respond to external 
buffeting. Furthermore, as discussed, where access is barred by narrow terms of 
inclusion, the experience of exclusion can generate pressure towards the 
development of counter-cultures. Both internally and externally generated 
pressures may be contained by coercion, e.g. through emphasising the policing 
role of administrators and by constructions of scarcity relating to basic goods. 
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This becomes necessary to preserve stability and to contain dynamics towards 
greater equality.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that the inclusion of genuinely incompatible and 
fundamental differences might be as damaging as the exclusion of those that are 
compatible. However, a society which strives to maximise the inclusion of 
diversity may well have the potential to be more stable than one that 
unnecessarily excludes. If all cultures are based on some form of shared 
characteristics, and this is required to promote cohesion, it becomes necessary 
to identify what these might be in a society which accommodates diversity. 
There are a number of ways in which cohesion may be achieved. Firstly, the 
desirability of including diversity needs to be embedded into a shared value-
base. Secondly, norms concerning behaviours, personal characteristics, 
resources and their inter-relationship need to be unpacked and wherever 
possible stereotypical assumptions concerning probable interconnections 
avoided. This is not to say that no blueprint exists, but that the blueprint 
incorporates a range of alternatives and is based on reliable indicators which do 
not conflate ‘the individual’ with ‘the average’. Thirdly, by minimising 
discrimination, recognising different types of resources and by making 
transactional infrastructure accessible, inclusion can be promoted. Greater 
diversity can be accommodated in the same structures, rather than additional 
annexes, in a redrawing of the boundary between sameness and difference. 
Fourthly, by devolving framing responsibilities to more and lower levels, but 
within a broad framework established at fewer and higher levels, localised 
diversity can be developed within those shared parameters. Rights can serve to 
delineate the parameters of that broad framework. They also mean that 
assessments must be made against explicit criteria, minimising the scope for 
discretionary and discriminatory judgements and maximising accountability. 
But, as discussed, indicators of ‘broad classes of people’ to whom social rights 
are to be accorded must be appropriate. For example, to base this on one 
characteristic alone when provision is designed to reflect others, would not be 
appropriate. Furthermore, the indicator may or may not be intrinsically reliable, 
and those concerned with behaviour frequently are not. The establishment of 
quality indicators which can demonstrate the fairness, equity and consistency of 
allocation, without major encroachments into civil liberties, is a major challenge 
for social policy.  
 
To summarise, a society designed to maximise the inclusion of diversity by 
widening the mainstream, would be expected to have the following features:  
¾ Many socio-cultural objectives are recognised and commonly valued, and 
consequently so too are different goods, currencies and sets of 
transactional processes 
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¾ Political power/framing is located in different places, at different societal 
levels and is disseminated to different individuals 
¾ Scarcity may be unavoidable in some situations, but it is not deliberately 
constructed, particularly around basic goods 
¾ Competition is diffused as people pursue different objectives, types of 
good and currency 
¾ Status can be achieved in a variety of ways 
¾ Inequality in any one type of resource is less likely to be indicative of 
exclusion 
¾ Norms, e.g. environmental, attitudinal, organisational, are broad and 
flexible as standard 
¾ Narrow norms are not relied upon as ‘short-cut’ means of ascribing 
identity 
¾ Attempts are made to ensure accuracy of indicators defining ‘broad 
classes of people’ for rights-based transactions, and for transactions more 
generally 
¾ Transactional infrastructure is accessible to people with a wide range of 
characteristics 
 
By extension, this approach also indicates the ways in which exclusion might 
occur in a society which is differently structured. If inclusion refers to 
participation in key transactional processes, the barriers to them can originate in 
various component parts of society’s structure. Exclusion can originate in, or 
apply to, any sphere – not just the social sphere. It thus might be more fitting to 
refer to exclusion as it applies to each separately, i.e. economic exclusion, 
political exclusion, etc. Bearing in mind that a given socio-cultural 
understanding, i.e. set of objectives and norms, may or may not be co-terminus 
with the geographical boundaries of a given society, a person might be socio-
culturally excluded or societally excluded. All are possible, but they mean 
different things. In all cases, they prevent the development of transactional 
relationships, whether on the basis of shared characteristics or power 
dependencies. In all cases, a combination of poverty and discrimination 
(deliberate or otherwise) is likely to be the root cause. 
 
This suggests a new vision of the type of society we might aspire towards, and 
the need for a new discourse through which to describe it. It is founded on the 
recognition that the ‘terms of inclusion’ are critical in determining the type of 
society, rather than whether it is inclusive, cohesive, equal or unequal per se. It 
is a society which allows as much as possible for the inclusion and coexistence 
of different socio-cultural objectives, which cherishes diversity while 
minimising the stigma associated with difference. It is a society in which 
everyone has a place, and is respected, not for their ability to conform, but for 
their uniqueness. Everyone can find a pocket of power and prestige in some 
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sphere and at some level without having to seek it out in counter-cultural 
hierarchies. Ultimately, it is a society which is empowered to evolve, as are each 
and every one of its members. 
 
So much for utopia. However, there are some inherent contradictions and 
inflexibilities which need to be addressed. A society is founded on the equal 
valuing of different objectives and currencies does not necessarily indicate a 
‘woolly liberalist’ approach where anything goes. An insistence on tolerance has 
the potential to be as rigid or fundamentalist as an insistence on intolerance. 
Those who persist in devaluing certain objectives or currencies might logically 
be unwelcome in a society which values them. While some degree of tension 
between contradictions and perspectives should be creative, and the toleration of 
difference must surely be a key feature of any democracy worthy of the name, 
where differences are so great that they cannot co-exist, tensions risk becoming 
destructive. Yet, even here, those whose objective it is to rewrite the terms of 
inclusion, to narrow down the gateway, and introduce rather than dismantle 
artificial barriers to transaction may have little power to impose their views. 
Decisions to exclude need to be explicit, and defendable as necessary, on the 
grounds that to do otherwise would to an unacceptable degree materially 
undermine the primary goal of maximising the inclusion of diversity into the 
mainstream. Furthermore, if an intolerance of those who do not support this is 
potentially far from woolly liberalism, neither does it support libertarianism. 
Instead social contexts and transactional processes may be modified, and agency 
curtailed where those responsible, purposefully or otherwise, designate as 
‘different’, with the result that people with certain characteristics which can in 
fact be accommodated are unnecessarily excluded from the mainstream.  
 
To the extent that society has choice about its terms of inclusion, it can choose 
to minimise or maximise the number of people who conform to them. But there 
will be some matters over which there is no choice. Basic needs have to be met. 
Certain types of job have to be done. External events may have repercussions, 
perhaps increasingly with globalisation. Immutable features of the environment 
may intersect with immutable characteristics of individuals. There may be 
occasions where this can be overcome with special add-on programmes, where 
caveats are introduced into the terms of inclusion with regard to people with 
certain characteristics who would otherwise be excluded (Barry 2001). Yet such 
an approach risks fuelling discrimination and stigma, serving to accentuate 
difference from the mainstream, and as such should be the strategy of last resort. 
Indicators may be intrinsically unreliable and time for assessments limited. 
Judgements will still be required about identity, even if the indicators and 
understandings on which they are based shift. Judgements too will be required 
about what constitutes an acceptable level of State intervention in the way 
people lead their lives, the attitudes they hold and what constitutes an acceptable 
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degree of monitoring of behaviour. Compromises will still be required between 
conflicting interests, where changing the terms to include one results in the 
exclusion of another.  
 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the mutability or immutability of barriers is 
often assumed and/or inaccurately assessed. There is scope for increasing 
flexibility in the socio-cultural environment, the construal of identities of 
individuals and the basis of their interaction via transactional processes, and this 
is the preferred means of maximising inclusion. Whatever the practical 
difficulties that may emerge, this paper has suggested that changes in attitudes, 
priorities and approach might well reveal scope for a redrafting of the terms of 
inclusion in order to promote and preserve greater diversity, while 
simultaneously accommodating it within the mainstream.  
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